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LINEAR SUPERPOSITION
AS A CORE THEOREM OF QUANTUM EMPIRICISM
YURII V. BREZHNEV
Abstract. Clarifying the nature of the quantum state |Ψ〉 is at the root of the problems
with insight into (counterintuitive) quantum postulates. We provide a direct—and math
axiom-free—empirical derivation of this object as an element of a vector space. Establishing
the linearity of this structure—quantum superposition—is based on a set-theoretic creation
of ensemble formations and invokes the following three principia: (I) quantum statics, (II)
doctrine of a number in a physical theory, and (III) mathematization of matching the two
observations with each other; quantum invariance. All of the constructs rest on a formal-
ization of the minimal experimental entity: micro-event, detector click. This is sufficient for
producing the C-numbers, axioms of linear vector space (superposition principle), statistical
mixtures of states, eigenstates and their spectra, and non-commutativity of observables. No
use is required of the concept of time. As a result, the foundations of theory are liberated
to a significant extent from the issues associated with physical interpretations, philosophical
exegeses, and mathematical reconstruction of the entire quantum edifice.
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1. Introduction
. . . somewhat curious that, even after
nearly a full century, physicists still do not
quite agree on what the theory tells us . . .
G. ’t Hooft [70, p. 5]
It is almost a crying shame that we are
nowhere close to that with quantum mechanics,
given that it is over 70 years old now
C. Fuchs [56, p. 32]
The contradiction between fundamental nature of quantum theory and phenomenological
feature of its mathematics [104] is likely to never cease instigating the attempts to overcome
it. The subject-matter and leitmotif of what follows is the fact that the linear superposition
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and theory’s axioms are entirely empirical in origin, and the challenges that accompany their
interpretations are a nonexistent problem coming from the “semantic confusion” [132, p. 10]
or from “a confusion of categories” [108, p. 89].
1.1. On foundations of quantum theory. The debates concerning the foundations of
quantum mechanics (QM) hitherto “show no sign of abating” [129, p. 222], [121, 84], and
despite widespread scepticism [85, 47, 43, 59, 109, 88] it is generally acknowledged that the
problem is a real one [127, 84, 106, 29]—it is not something made up or “just a dispute
over words” [2, p. 5]—and sometimes “has been regarded as a very serious one” [88, p. 418],
[156]. It is worth noting that in recent decades the discussions have even worsened [56,
57], and current research has intensified, due to the tremendously increased and formerly
inconceivable technological possibilities of operating with individual micro-objects and the
urge to implement the idea of quantum computing [36, 2].
The reason for this state of affairs remains the same as it was before. Unlike the clas-
sical theories—e. g., thermodynamics or relativity theory, the QM-axiomatics seems wholly
divorced from human language [110, 38, 3, 61, 18, 44, 69, 84, 111, 121, 132, 134, 88]. Quantum
postulates are not merely formal. They express themselves in terms of linear operators on a
complex Hilbert space H [7, 13, 35, 59, 72, 108, 110, 80, 85] and there is not—literally—one
word here that can be brought into conjunction with reality by means that have at least
some kind of relationship with classical description. What is more, it is very well known
that the abstract character of these terms is required by the essence of the point (invari-
ance) and, at the same time, that the attempt to link them with physical images leads to
the famous paradoxes associated with such concepts as causality, (non)locality, and realism
[63, 157, 4, 5, 6, 18, 58, 60, 84, 89, 61]. All of that causes a problem with interpretations
of QM.
It is well known that the theory has steadfastly resisted reconciliation between interpreta-
tions, which is reflected not only in the voluminousness of the literature. The differences in
viewpoint are often based on points of principle [14, 126, 128, 64, 121, 88, 109, 55, 104, 136],
and even highly qualified publications face criticism [46, 95, 117, 101]. Among other things,
we encounter appeals [74, 43, 58, 3, 104, 1, 94, 127] (there is even a manifest [148]), striking ti-
tles such as “scandal of quantum mechanics” [75], “the Oxford Questions . . . to two clouds”
[25, p. 6], “quantum mechanics for the Soviet naval officers” [166, p. 161], “Church of the
Larger Hilbert Space” (J. Smolin) [56, 43], and also April Fools’ jokes [21], political parallels
with “Marxism” and “the Cold War” [54], and many more [11, 27, 84, 104, 137, 140, 61].
An interesting fact. Cambridge University Press has published a 500-page-long book [56]
containing the remarkable electronic correspondence—D. Mermin called it “samizdat” (‘self-
published’)—between C. Fuchs and modern researchers and philosophers in the field of quan-
tum foundations. This correspondence has continued [57, over 2300 pages] and now covers
the past two decades. It characterizes the state of affairs in the field [55](!), and does not
merely add to one’s impression of the unending discussions about quantum matters (see also
introductory section in [166]), it also, due to the lack of formality, represents a source of ideas
and of valuable thoughts. Schlosshauer’s very informative ‘quantum interviews’ [127] pursue
the same goals.
The lack of transparent motivations for mathematics—a pressing requirement of physics—
means that QM-formalism is hard to distinguish from a “cook book of procedures and rituals”
(J. Nash) or “user-manual” [134, p. 1690], [164], [61, p. xiii]. Therefore the “dissatisfaction
regarding comprehension” and the “need for interpretation that is alien to an exact science”
[163, pp. 7–8] lead to the fact that “we admit, be it willingly or not, that quantum mechanics
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is not a physical theory but a mathematical model” [134, p. 1701] or that “nature imitates a
mathematical scheme” (Heisenberg [71, p. 347]). In fact, “we have essentially no∗ grasp on
why the theory takes the precise structure that it does” [56, p. 32], which raises the suspicion
that “something is wrong with the theory” (H. Putnam) and that “this quantum skyscraper
is built on very shaky ground” [166, p. 8].
At the same time, well-founded opinions have long been known to the effect that “quantum
theory needs no ‘interpretation’” [58], [43, 75, 104] or that “only consequences of the basic
tenets of quantum mechanics can be verified by experiment, and not its basic laws” [47, p. 16].
In other words, the discrepancies between opinions are significant, and often radical: from
epithets such as “schizoid∗∗, situation is desperate” [88, p. 420], [114, p. 424] to vindication
of quantum computations [36] and whole books written on the subject [121]. In any case, the
contradictions in the views [7, 69], [143, sect. 5.5] cannot be considered an acceptable state of
affairs (see also sect. 11.1), for the simple reason that the ‘quantum philosophy’ issues turn
into an ‘industry’ of interpretations, while at the same time the very same philosophers call
for its denial: “interpretation of QM emerged as a growth industry” [98, p. 92].
1.2. Formula of superposition. Contrariwise, the “dominant role of mathematics in con-
structing quantum mechanics” has lead to that mathematical “assumptions are usually con-
sidered to be physical” [134, p. 1691]. That is to say, “there has been a substitution of
concepts” [164, p. 295] and “one of the consequences of quantum revolution was the replace-
ment of explanations of physical phenomena by their mathematical description” [164, p. 296].
These characteristics convey, in the best possible way, the dissatisfaction with the fact that
quantum physics “was actually reduced to a physical interpretation of the Hilbert space the-
ory” [134, p. 1690]. The H-space in itself is a fairly cumbersome mathematical structure, and
even determines a crucial principle—superposition of states [38]. It is thus not surprising
that this principle becomes “one of the vague points . . . the [Dirac] argument is difficult to
consider as rational . . . the physical principle simply fits underneath it” (excerpt from preface
to the Russian edition of [130]).
Mathematics of the H-space contains three constituents: a vector space, the inner-product
add-on over it, and topology. The two latter ones invoke the first one which is completely
independent (algebra) and begins with the formula
|ψ〉 = a · |ϕ〉 + b · |χ〉. (1)
This is the core expression of quantum theory. Comprehending its genesis is tantamount to
comprehending the nature of the linearity of QM. In (1), there appear symbols of complex
numbers a, b ∈ C, of operations · and +, and also of vectors |ψ〉, |ϕ〉, |χ〉 ∈ H. It is clear that
until an empirical basis for all these devices is found, the interpretation of abstraction (1)
and questions of the kind “Quantum States: What the Hell Are They?” (55 times in [57])
will remain a problem. To all appearances, the problem is considered so difficult—“quantum
states . . . cannot be ‘found out’” [121, p. 428]—that the non-axiomatic meaning of these
symbols was not even discussed in the literature. In the meantime, not only is the situation
far from hopeless, but it also admits a solution. The present work is devoted to gradual
progress towards an understanding of formula (1). Stated differently, equality (1) becomes
an empirical theorem (p. 52).
∗Throughout the text, the italic and slanted type in “quotations” is original, unless otherwise indicated.
∗∗The case in point is the many-world conception by Everett–DeWitt. See also pages 158, 161, 176–179 in
[37] regarding the “state of schizophrenia” and ‘explanations’ as to why “schizophrenia cannot be blamed
on quantum mechanics” [37, p. 182].
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• The main part of the challenge is not only to ascertain what is being added/
multiplied in (1), but also to realize primarily what ‘to add/multiply’ is.
Moreover, besides the symbols {a, b, |ψ〉, |ϕ〉, |χ〉, ·, +} the expression (1) contains an equals
sign = (see also [9, 102]), and, surprising as it may seem, it conceals one of the key points:
the 3-rd principium of quantum theory (III, p. 28).
The guiding observation is based on the fact that the only thing that we have access to are
the microscopic events, and therefore “we have little to begin with other than what an exper-
imental physicist would call experiments with a single microsystem” [90, p. 5]. Consequently,
we must begin from them and from collecting them into ensemble formations. It is precisely in
this context that we will use the word empiricism—quantum empiricism of micro-acts—and
it is in this respect that quantum theory has a statistical nature; as predicted by Einstein∗
[69, Ch.7–8] and von Neumann [110, 137], long championed by Ballentine [10] and justified in
detail by Ludwig [90, 91, 92, 93]. A. Leggett proposes in this regard the “extreme statistical
interpretation” [86], [127, p. 79] and remarks clearly that “to seek any further “meaning” in
the formalism is pointless and can only generate pseudoquestions”. With that, he overtly
adds such characteristics as “complete gibberish” [86, p. 70] and “verbal window dressing”
[127, p. 79]. The difficulty is, of course, in creating the object |ψ〉 itself. A step-by-step
characterization of this procedure (sects. 3–8) and key words to what follows are reflected in
the very (sub)section titles listed in the Contents.
1.3. Physics ⇄ mathematics. Doctrine of numbers. Thus the situation appears to be
one whereby the mathematical add-on’s are difficult to reconcile with physical motivations
(physical principles) [20], while attempts to axiomatize an interface between them [65] only
conceal a deeper insight [156]. T. Maudlin: “. . . physicists have been misled by the mathe-
matical language they use to represent the physical world”. In other words, we observe an
overemphasis on the role of the ‘ready-made’ math-structures and an under-evaluation of
(‘seemingly na¨ıve’) empirical considerations.
What we propose below is an implementation of the idea that such a view must be aban-
doned and replaced by a negation of the prior existence of both physical (pre)conceptions
and mathematical structures. Physics and mathematics should be created ‘from scratch’;
“coherent theory of physics and mathematics” [20, p. 639]. Then, due to the initial absence
of mathematics, the introduction of mathematical structures is almost ruled out, proofs must
yield to empirical inference, and the physics language—the language of physical reasoning—is
initially under a linguistic ban whatsoever. It cannot exist a priori. In other words, even the
natural-language conjunction of terms with physical adjectives (and verbs [67]) becomes far
from being free, as with the classical description’s language (sects. 2.1, 5.4, 6.4, 6.5). The en-
semble formations have to come to the fore and the reasoning should be subordinated only to
the low-level microscopic empiricism. This immediately touches on its closest creation—the
notion of a number, since numbers do not come ‘from the sky’, and the theory will have to be
a quantitative one. Despite the overflow of abstracta in QM-theory, the doctrine of number—
{number×unit}, to be precise (sect. 7, 9)—has likely not yet got into foundational discussions
[62]. Consequently, the numbers turn into a kind of ‘problem of numbers’ (principium II) and
a substantial part of what follows is devoted to this.
∗A. Einstein: “It may be a correct theory of statistical laws, but an inadequate conception of individual
elementary processes” [69, p. 156]; see also [41, pp. 38–40].
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In a nutshell, all the subsequent ideology can be schematized as follows.
natural language, prolegomena to the quantum
(no math and ontology here)
(sect. 2)
↓ ↓
accumulation of micro-events,
low-level quantum empiricism, ensemble mixtures
(sects. 3–4)
↓ ↓
mathematization of ensembles’ empiricism
(how does the math come about?)
(sect. 5)
↓ ↓
quantum superposition principle, QM-linearity
(no physical notions and numbers here)
(sect. 6)
↓ ↓
algebraic structure ‘the numbers R and C’,
binary and unary operations
(sect. 7)
↓ ↓
QM state-space = linear vector space,
formula (1)
(sect. 8)
↓ ↓
naturalness and inevitability of abstracta,
observable quantities and their values
(no interpretations here)
(sects. 9–10)
This scheme cannot be reduced or re-structured.
By and large, the aforesaid ideology is supported by the common belief—often certainty
even [43]—that QM is not perturbative, its linearity is not associated with linear approxima-
tion of something else, and that in general, it is not extensible (ultimate [33]) and must be
free of interpretations [43]. All of these concerns, in one way or another, are directly related
to derivation of formula (1).
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2. Points of departure
In the Beginning was the Word
A. Zeilinger [157, 01:05′47′′]
Most of the time the apparatus
is empty and sometimes you have
a photon is coming through
A. Zeilinger [157, 12′39′′]
Since empiricism is in essence supra-mathematical [28], i. e., it is concerned with meta-
mathematics [79, 118], its mathematization—theory construction—should begin not with
postulates and definitions, but with the formation of an object language and of vocabulary [92,
94]. A. Peterson: “Math can never be used in phys until have words” [17, p. 209]. Therefore,
relying on the established understanding of the fundamental reasons for the quantum view of
physical observation [110, 7, 59, 61], up until the end of this section we will adopt the natural-
language meaning of the words observation, state, numbers, physical influence, large/small,
micro/macro, etc. Their contents will later be defined more precisely or entirely changed.
For instance, the meaning of the word ‘state’ will be radically transformed, to which we are
drawing attention in advance. Accordingly, a degree of informality, clarified on page 28 in
Remark 10, is inevitable here.
2.1. Variations as micro-level transitions. We will (and ‘must’ [79, Ch. 3]) first view
the concept of a system at an intuitive level [40, sect. 1.1]: there is what is referred to as
‘system S’.
S Let us tentatively (a priori) relate the concept of a state to the associated context
described by the words ‘the system S can be different, or in different states’. That
is to say, system S is always in a certain state Ψ belonging to the set T = {Ψ,Φ, . . .},
each element of which is admissible for S, and all of them are different from each
other: Ψ 6= Φ.
The statement ‘states are different’ does not require a consideration when Ψ and Φ, referred
to as state, are the abstract elements of an abstract set T = {Ψ,Φ, . . .}. However, in order to
tie its elements to reality, we have to introduce the criteria of coincidence/distinguishability
of one from the other. Criteria may come exclusively from observational procedures, without
which it is impossible to either detect states, or claim that they differ, coincide, exist or that
they actually occur.
On the other hand, the nature of micro-phenomena shows that observations are always
associated with irreducible intervention in the system, manifesting in what is known as tran-
sition Ψ  Ψ′ (or destruction∗). Due to a lack of criteria, there is no sense in attributing
adjectives small/large, (in)significant/partial, or collocations like ‘comparison of destructions
at instants t1, t2’ to this concept. Let us proceed from the idea that initially there is nothing
but the transition. Transitions may actually occur without destructions Ψ Ψ, however.
Two different Ψ, Φ may be destroyed into new Ψ′, Φ′, as well as into the combinations of
old/new. Thus, strictly speaking, the meaning of words ‘different, new, . . . ’ eludes us in this
case, which is why even the identification of Ψ-elements and the T itself, as a set, become
questionable. Therefore, besides the formal writings Ψ = Φ and Ψ 6= Φ for Ψ,Φ ∈ T, the
physical distinguishability/equivalence (recognizability 6≈/≈) needs to be established. As to
the identity in this regard, see von Neumann’s reasoning “One might object against II . . . ”
on page 302 of his book [110]. The sole thing that distinguishability may rely on are the
∗As an example, observations at colliders are literally the destructions, and mass at that.
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transition acts. In turn, variation is a key element in transitions, that is why we will begin
constructing with distinguishability.
Let us take the still virtually unlimited way A of intervening
A
99 in S, and attempt to
introduce distinguishability Ψ 6≈ Φ as A -distinguishability. Due to the fact that micro-tran-
sition Ψ
A
99 Ψ′ is not pre-determined, initial states Ψ undergo arbitrarily free changes. Next
time, the results will be different and absolutely arbitrary (the term ‘different’ is understood
to be 6=), and each act is indiscernible from a case in which it contains ones similar to itself
within itself. It would be natural to associate such a case to the absurd, which is unrelated
to the meaning of the words ‘physical observation’, and to discard the given A .
Non-meaninglessness arises only if we impose the negation of random combinations of 6=
and = in transitions, at least for a part of T, i. e., introduce the preservation acts Ψ
A
99 Ψ.
The ‘preservation’ should be read here as indestructibility of state, i. e., as a (=)-coincidence
under the secondary act Ψ Ψ Ψ. Otherwise, the vanishing difference between ‘preserva-
tion’ and ‘variation’ leads to a linguistic chaos [52, p. 232]. This means that the destruction
Ψ Ψ′ may not be considered as a 1-fold one. State Ψ′ on the right should be examined for
changeability and transform into the left part of the subsequent transition: Ψ  Ψ′  Ψ′′.
Thereby, the structure Ψ′  Ψ′′ with the binate entity ‘before/after’ or ‘on the left/right’
becomes the key one, and we consider it an initial object in subsequent constructs. Preserved
states are, by definition, those that pass the reproducibility test.
Thus logic requires to begin with the transition compositions
Ψ
A
999 Ψ′
A
999 Ψ′′
A
999 · · · ,
wherein the cases like
Ψ′
A
999 Ψ′
A
999 Ψ′′ (2)
are ruled out (a ban on changing of what has been unchanged), and the never-ending sequence
Ψ
A
999 Ψ′
A
999 · · ·
A
999 Ψ′′
A
999 · · · (3)
(non-recognisability of states) must be terminated
Ψ
A
999 Ψ′
A
999 · · ·
A
999 Ψ′′
A
999 α
A
999 α, (4)
yielding a ‘finiteness’ ( = the realistic) and the concept of conserved/distinctive α-states. The
terminology α-event [43] could be used instead.
Freedom of elements in sequence (4), including the choice of α-states, is not limited by
anything besides the ban on (2). Therefore this arbitrariness, which is physically never rec-
ognizable, curtails the generic chain (4) into the shortened one
Ψ
A
999 · · · · · ·
A
999 α
A
999 α, (5)
which is identical to the scheme
· · ·Ψ · · ·
A
999 α
A
999 α (6)
with certain α ∈ T.
Discussions on “how . . . ” and “what happens” [110, p. 217] at the very microscopic level
are extremely widespread in the literature [60, 5, 74, 89, 95, 106, 163] (see [4, 7, 123, 29] for
the exhaustive references), although it is not difficult to predict the fact that the attempts
to understand the inner structure of box (6) will only lead back to an identical box.
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Actually, the uncontrollability of micro-changes is universally known, yet describing them
as a process in time t 7→ t + ε will start employing the language terminology—functions,
arithmetic operations, etc—that has not yet been created even for the fixed instants t1, t2.
However, what may be associated with fixed time are only non-temporal entities, for which we
have nothing but transitions (5). The attempt to manage them, i. e., to control intervention
in S, leads to looping or ‘measuring the measurement’, not to mention the ambiguity of the
term itself.
G. Ludwig: “it is not meaningful to speak of a measurement “at time t˜.” . . . the
real physical meaning of the time parameter . . . has nothing to do with the notion
“time of measurement.”” [90, p. 288].
See also [91, p. 365], [93, p. 150], [94, p. 100]. Just as before, the physical assessments like
‘abrupt’, ‘(ir)reversible’, ’(non)simultaneous’, “immediately following . . . ,” [110, p. 231, 410],
or ‘weak/nondemolishing’ (measurements [95]), etc are unacceptable here. No temporal pro-
cess may be present in the foundations of the theory [90, Ch. VII.4, 6], [91, Chs. III, XVII],
[92], since it is not immediately clear ‘And what exactly are we having at instants t1 or t2?’.
Remark 1. All said above means that attempts to deduce QM dynamically [127, 10 · Reconstruc-
tions] are beforehand doomed to vicious circles ‘round the boxes’ and time t like attempts to ‘vindicate’
dynamically Lorenz’s contraction instead of kinematic postulates of the relativity theory [27]. Con-
sistent theory must rest either on ‘irreducible’ elements (6) or upon ‘boxes’ of a different kind. In the
latter case, the theory becomes a particular model with interpretation; e. g., the Lindblad equations
[153, 154], decoherence [73, 160, 123, 125], stochastic dynamics, and other statistic-dynamical models
[4, 163]. Anyway, an ability to model and understanding are not the same thing, and this point, with
regard to quantum theory, was repeatedly emphasized in the literature [134], [127].
Now, if theory is built as a fundamental one, rather than as a model [127, p. 144], with
primary entity changeability
A
99 , a box (6) may only be involved in it as the initial starting
point and as an indescribable object with the absolute rather than with a relative sense.
Elements of reality, in any understanding (say, Bell’s ‘beables’ [18]), may not exist before/
after/inside/outside of the box. It can be only structureless. Accordingly, the notions of
preparation, of measurement, of ‘interaction with’, and of a physical process are meaningless
without construction (6). These statements are clearly in agreement with the fact that any
reasoning must not contradict the formal logical rules [79], hence, there must exist [118,
131, 20] the empirically undefinable logical atoms. A. Peres: “While quantum theory can
in principle describe anything, a quantum description cannot include everything. In every
physical situation something must remain unanalyzed” [113, p. 173]. Or, expressed by Pauli’s
words, “Like the ultimate fact without any cause, the individual outcome of a measurement is
. . . not comprehended by laws”. In particular, the set T and transitions-arrows
A
99 are also
the atoms. Englert: “. . . preexisting concept . . . We cannot formulate the theory without
this concept” [43, p. 2]. From the aforesaid, we may formulate the following observation.
I Quantum statics should precede quantum dynamics
(the 1-st principium of QM-theory).
The rationales do not end here, and will be later amplified once we begin to exploit the
terminology that is usually taken for granted from the outset; namely, the quantitative de-
scriptions [56, p. 178]. If they arise not as numeric interpretations of something, but out of an
experiment, then observation should be the beginning, and the ‘manufacture of numbers’—
the end. In other words, the model ‘theory with boxes’ other than (5)–(6) implicitly implies
the logical sequence {model of process֌ numeric interpretation}, where empiricism holds a
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role other than primary. It is clear that, regardless of the model, such a situation will always
remain unsatisfactory in the physical respect.
2.2. Observation. The sequences addressed above lead to the following outcome.
• Any physically meaningful micro-act
A
99 either saves a state (α
A
99 α) or turns
it into a conserved one (Ψ
A
99 α).
The two extremes do not contradict this fact. The first—maximally rough observations—is
when all states are destroyed into a certain one: Ψ Ψ0 (‘whatever and however we watch,
all we see is one and the same’). In this, the state Ψ0 is not destroyed: Ψ0  Ψ0. Another
extreme is when none of the states are destroyed: Ψ Ψ. This is the case of ideal (quantum)
observation, but, due to the absence of any changes, it is indistinguishable from the case of
if observations are entirely absent.
A case with two distinctive states
α1
A
999 α1 , α2
A
999 α2 (7)
is the simplest among these extremes. Of course, the α’s are prohibited from transitioning
into each other. Because there is still the free admissibility of transitions Ψ
A
99 α1, Ψ
A
99 α2,
we can turn the semantic sequence{
arbitrariness ֌ preservation ֌ distinctive α’s
}
into the more rigorous schemeT = {Ψ, Φ, . . .} + A -observations ֌ {α1 , α2 , . . .} =: TA ⊂ T, (8)
which gives rise to the concept of a physical distinguishability (‘distinguo’), albeit partially.
It is formally defined only on the subset TA : the statement α1 6≈ α2 is equivalent to (7). To
avoid overloading the further notation, we do not use symbols like ≈A and 6≈A ; the context
is always obvious.
O By a physical observation A or, in short, observation we will mean such interven-
tions∗
A
99K, in which the ‘never-ending’ chaos (3) is replaced by a chaos with the
notion of a preservation, i. e., ‘chaos with rule (6)’:
Ψ
A
999K α and α
A
999K α. (9)
The set of α-objects TA with the property
α1
A
999K α1 , α2
A
999K α2 , . . . (10)
is discrete, and the αs themselves are termed the eigen (proper) for observation
A . They defines A and do not depend on S. No logical connection between Ψ
(the left of (9)), family TA , and system S exists.
Expressed another way, introduction of the conception ‘the eigen’ is equivalent to the following
informal, yet minimal motivation: at least some certainty instead of total arbitrariness.
Two instruments A and B may have arbitrarily different eigen-states {α1, . . . , αn} 6=
{β1, . . . , βm}. Accordingly, as regards observation B, the (distinctive) states {αs} do not
differ, in general, from the ‘regular’ Ψ’s, i. e., from those chaotically destroyable into the B-
∗More comprehensive terminology: micro-act of observation by instrument A . The zig-zag arrow 99 is
also replaced with the straight one 99K.
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eigen states βk. All kinds of instruments A , B, . . . are thus defined by aggregates TA , TB,
. . . . The number |TA | of corresponding α-objects therein may be an arbitrary integer. There
are also no (logical) grounds for restricting/prescribing the composition of TA . Any element
of T may be the conserved one for a certain instrument. Parenthetically, the notion of eigen-
state—in different forms—is sometimes present in axiomatics of QM [115, 19, 106].
In a generic case, the chaos present in (9) leaves open the problem of correlating the
recognizability Ψ 6≈ Φ (or Ψ ≈ Φ) with physics. Clearly, the issue is linked to the ambiguity
of the term Ψ-state itself, which is used in pt. S—an important point—due to the need to
start with something, since building the mathematical description without some sort of a set
is impossible.
Remark 2. Informally, metalinguistic semantics—association of meanings with texts—is in general
as follows. Inasmuch as we are receiving different α-responses to each micro-act
A
99K, let us say that ‘on
the other side from us there is something that can also be different, and all of that is to be described’.
This reflects our intuitive perception of reality, which, both at micro- and macro-level, boils down to
an ineradicable pair: {something outside} + {that which can be different for us} (pt. S). If we give
up any of these conceptual premises—‘something outside’ (Ψ) and ‘can be different’ (αj)—then, as
above, we face a linguistic dead end, as the basis for reasoning disappears. Because of this the arrow
A
99K must be accompanied by ‘some thing’ to the left and the right of it. The low-level set T = {Ψ, Φ,
. . . , α1, α2, . . . } does arise. Then the arbitrary elements Ψ ∈ T (unrestricted chaos) are assigned to
the left of this act instead of ‘some thing’, and the micro 6≈-distinguishable α-objects (αj 6≈ αs)—to
the right. Put another way,
• what’s being abstracted is not “concrete things” [59, p. 27] but a primitive element of
perception—micro-event α-click∗. Other than ‘the click’, no any entities—like knowledge,
human “psychology/memory” [45, 46], consciousness [101, 147, 140], etc—may exist in em-
piricism. The click is a kind of (experimental) the ‘0-principium’ of QM. Therefore the initial
mathematical premises of QM-theory should contain nothing but the 6≈A -distinguishability
and formalization (9)–(10).
It may be added that the micro-observation, as such, is terminated at the eigen elements; one and
the same αj has always remained on the right.
As a result, the minimal experimental entity Ψ
A
99K α constitutes, mathematically, an
ordered pair (Ψ, αj) of elements of the set T, which are labeled by the symbol A that is
equivalent to the TA -family (8). Accordingly, the customary (physical) notion of the obser-
vation is substituted for a micro-event, an act.
2.3. Numeric realizations. Is there a possibility to rely exclusively on the inflexibility
of the eigen-type elements (10)? Or to define the sought-for ultimate distinguishability 6≈
through the A -(micro)distinguishabilities αj 6≈A αs? Let us formulate a thesis.
T There is no (linguistic) means of recognizing the system S to be different (pt. S),
other than through the results of its destructions into the {α1, α2, . . . }-objects of
observational instruments A .
To be sure, the stringency of this linguistic taboo (T) must be accompanied by something
constructive, and we will adopt the following programme that reflects the fact that the
unequivocal description may take only the form of a quantitative mathematical theory.
∗As to these ‘qualia’, see answers of Cˇ. Brukner (!) on pp. 41–43 in [127], his work [26, p. 98], the page 635
in [156], and the work [149].
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R (•) Out of the primary (‘proto’)elements {Ψ, α, . . .} ∈ T, one constructs a new set
H, of which the elements
|Ξ〉 := ⊕(a1, |α1〉; a2, |α2〉; . . .) ∈ H (11)
are said to be (numeric) representations in the ‘reference frame for instrument A ’,
and as are the numeric objects. The distinguishability relation 6≈A is carried over
to H and admits an a-coordinate realization there; symbol 6≈.
(••) No preferential or preordained observational reference frame A {α1, α2, . . .}—
‘instrument the absolute’—exists.
Identification (11) is always tied to a certain family TA . Accordingly, images of αs—
symbols |αs〉—will be present in (11), and character ⊕ is also no more than a symbol here.
Even though coordinates as are declared to be numbers or aggregates of numbers, there is no
arithmetic stipulated for them yet. The number is as yet a name for as. Distinguishability
|Ψ〉 6≈ |Ψ˜〉 of two representatives
⊕(a1, |α1〉; a2, |α2〉; . . .) =: |Ψ〉, ⊕(a˜1, |α1〉; a˜2, |α2〉; . . .) =: |Ψ˜〉
by means of numbers ak 6= a˜k and mathematical implementation of (11) and of the H-space,
i. e., a ‘coordinatization’ scheme, have yet to be established. This will comprise the meaning
of the word ‘constructs’ (sects. 7–8), which may not be even linked to the mathematical term
mapping yet, since no math of QM exists at the moment. It immediately follows that the
question about numeric entities—specifically, about (11)—is nontrivial in physics.
II To speak of an exact correspondence between empiricism and mathematics makes
no sense until the mechanism of emergence of that which is understood by number∗
has been detailed (the 2-nd principium of QM-theory).
From pts. T, R, and II it also follows that the search for a description through hidden variables,
over which something is averaged, is indistinguishable from the utopian attempts to find out
an intrinsic content of boxes (5).
2.4. Macro and micro. The task becomes more precise at this point. Instead of nonphysical
identity/noncoincidence (Ψ = Φ or Ψ 6= Φ) of two abstract elements Ψ, Φ of the abstract set
T, the concept of a physical ∼∼-equivalence (6∼∼-distinguishability) of H-representatives {|Ψ〉,
|Φ〉, . . . } is needed. That is, there must hold either relation |Ψ〉 ∼∼ |Φ〉 or its negation
|Ψ〉 6∼∼ |Φ〉 for all |Ψ〉, |Φ〉 ∈ H. The primitive set T, initially required by point S, must
disappear from the ultimate mathematics in terms of |Ψ〉 ∈ H. Therefore elements Ψ ∈ T
are henceforth named primitives. In summary,
• There is no a priori way to endow the term (quantum) state of system S with
any meaning [88, p. 419]. This concept should be created. It may not have a
definition. Meanwhile, one cannot get around the concept of a (micro)observation
A [26, pp. 98–100], [112, p. 646], [20, 13]. Essentially, no one thing, including Ψ,
α, or the T-set itself, can be the primary bearer of data on S.
The notions of a physical observable and of its observable values [90] are also ambiguous at
this point. Their ambiguity is even greater than that of state, due to questions like ‘what is
∗What an empiric/observer understands by the word ‘number’. The underlying message here implies that
the reliance upon the all-too-familiar abstract arithmetic elucidates nothing. There is no arithmetic in
experiments—there are only clicks there—and empirical nature of its emergence must be scrutinized.
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being measured?’ and even ‘what is a measurement?’. Nonetheless, we will not discard the
habitual (pt. S) term state up until the end of this section.
Irreproducibility of outcomes, i. e., ‘turnability of Ψ-primitives into the various’ leaves only
one option: ‘to take a look at S again, once again, . . . ’. In other words, to seek the source
of description in repeatability. It is necessary, then, to move to the subject of macro-, rather
than micro-observation. This intention fits perfectly with the undefined verb ‘constructs’ in
pt. R, and the following paradigm should be understood as the macro.
M The only way of handling the uncontrollable micro-level changes is the considera-
tion of the results of repeated destructions, accompanied by what we shall call the
common physical macro-environment (experimental context):
A
Ψ · · · Ψ Ψ · · · Ψ · · ·· · ·9
9
K
9
9
K
9
9
K
9
9
K
9
9
K
9
9
K
9
9
K
α1 · · · α1 α2 · · · α2 · · ·· · ·
A + {common macro-environment M}. (12)
An importance of repetitions and distinguishability had long been noted (Bohr, von Neumann
et al [71]) and recently it was particularly emphasized in the work [161]. The words ‘copy/
repeat. . ./distin. . . ’ occur 90 times therein.
Thus empiricism of quantum statics forces us to operate exclusively with such formations of
copies α, . . . , Ψ, and this is the maximum amount of data provided by the supra-mathematical
problem setup. All further mathematical structures may come only from constructions like
(12) and from nothing else. Getting ahead of ourselves, let us turn our attention to the fact
that implementation of this idea is not short-length—“the mathematization process (cor) is
not simple” [94, p. 24], and sects. 3–9 are devoted specifically to this idea.
One can once again repeat (sect. 1.3) that much of what follows does not and cannot contain
the mathematical proofs as they are usually present in the literature on quantum founda-
tions. Instead, there appears the step-by-step inference of objects as they result themselves:
numbers, operations, groups, algebras, etc. The only instrument that may be applicable here
is the empirical inference.
The common macro-environment M in (12) is also considered as a supra-mathematical
notion [118], the mathematical implementation of which is yet to be created. The same
considerations regarding qualitative adjectives are applicable as to the physical convention
M as well as the transition acts in sect. 2.1. Representations (11) are the formalization of the
meaning {observation + data on system S}, but now with no references to the elementary
acts in (12). The physical distinguishability criteria |Ψ〉 6∼∼ |Φ〉 may not be formulated yet
(physical attributes are not yet available), but |αs〉-elements have already appeared in (11)
as prototypes of explicitly distinguishable αs.
Remark 3. Dual form of the typical quantum statements like ‘S is a micro-system and A -instru-
ment is a macro-object’ (Bohr) is identical to the initial premise ‘observation does always destroy a
system’. It follows that there is actually little need for that terminology. Indeed, QM-micro has no
internal structure and, hence, an often discussed issue about boundary (and limit∗) between micro
and macro [121, 69, 10, 7] is devoid of sense. This may be a matter only of ‘different macros’—the
‘smaller/bigger’; i. e., when they describe certain models.
As a (partially philosophical) aside, we note that what is understood by observational randomness
does, in fact, boil down to distinguishability, and more specifically, to postulating the micro-chaos
(9). In considering the denial of (9) as an impossible proposition, we arrive at the M-paradigm and
conclude that the only way to deal with that which is contemplated for the subject-matter of a physical
∗A. Zeilinger: “. . . no limit. The limit is only a question of . . . money and of experience” [157, 13′09′′].
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description must be the treatment of micro-acts as ensembles [105, Lect. 6]. In other words, and in
accordance with the outline of the clicks’ analysis set out below, the determinism of micro-processes
(micro-ontology)—much less the microscopic time-arrow—is meaningless as a concept, since they are
not processes but structure-less acts that have not even any relationship to each other. Since there
are as yet no any physical phenomena as such, the claim that ‘phenomenon-1 appears to be the cause
that precedes phenomenon-2 as the effect’ is no more than a collection of words. To attribute to
them physical content and mathematical formulation at the micro-level is impossible in principle;
the ‘problem of boxes’ noted above. Accordingly, the cause of (classical) macro-indeterminism is the
absurdity of the notion of its twin concept—micro-determinism—and the unavoidable repetition of
the arrows 99K (M). N. Bohr: “there can be no question of causality in the ordinary sense of the word”
[71, p. 351]. See also [105, p. 223].
2.5. Quantum ensembles and statistics. Let us call the upper row in (12), as a Ψ-copy
set, (quantum) homogeneous ensemble (von Mises Kollektiv [105]). We will designate it,
simplifying when needed, by any way
{ΨΨ · · ·Ψ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
N times
} ≡ {Ψ · · ·Ψ}N ≡ {Ψ}N ,
where N is understood to be an arbitrary large number. Scheme (12) dictates also to consider
the generic ensembles{
{α1 · · ·α1}n1 {α2 · · ·α2}n2 · · · · · ·
}
, {· · ·Ψ · · ·ΨΦ · · ·ΦΘ · · ·Θ · · ·} (13)
as collections of homogeneous sub-ensembles. Ensembles are symbolized in the same manner
as sets, but, for the convenience of perception, without the numerous commas and internal
parentheses {} in (13); for example,{
ab · · · b{bca} · · ·
}
= {a, b, . . . , b, b, c, a, . . .} = · · · =: {ab · · · bbca · · ·}.
Scheme (12) is the first point where numbers emerge in a theory, and conversion
{α-ensemble (13)} ֌ (n1 , n2 , . . .)
into the integer collection precedes a numerical A -measurement of S. Quantities ns ∈ Z
+,
however, should not be associated with such, as they are potentially infinite. The minimal
way of creating the knowingly finite numbers out of independent and potential infinities ns
(without loss of their independence) is to divide each of them by a greater infinity, which is
a ‘constant’ Σ for the entire ensemble (13). It is clear that one should put
Σ := n1 + n2 + · · · and ν1 :=
n1
Σ
, ν2 :=
n2
Σ
, . . . (Σ→∞), (14)
and that ensemble (13) does not provide any numerical data besides the relative frequen-
cies (14). All the other data are functions of νs. An independence of the theory from the
ensemble’s Σ-constant, i. e., the procedure Σ → ∞, is also implied to be a principle—the
Σ-postulate. Without Σ-postulate of infinity, there can be no question of a theory, i. e.,
empiricism will not turn into a mathematics.
Thus the M-paradigm (12) does not only give birth to a concept of ‘numerical data in the
theory’ per se, but also converts their Z+-discreteness into the R-continuum of real measure-
ments. Namely, numbers νs ∈ R are the statistics (ν1, ν2, . . .) of destructions
A
99K into the
ensemble of primitives {{α1}n1 , {α2}n2 , . . . }.
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2.6. Distinguishability and numbers. Distinguishability of the two ensembles now turns
out to be the R-numerical, i. e., it is determined by the difference between ν-numbers. As a
result, and according to pt. R, the two elements |Ψ〉 6≈A |Ψ˜〉 of H will differ in the numbers
as and a˜s, if the latter turn out to be the bearers of different statistics
νj(a1, a2, . . .) 6= ν˜j(a˜1, a˜2, . . .). (15)
Hence, distinguishability 6≈ is carried over to H with an extension to the non-eigen objects,
but it is inherently incomplete, since it does not take into consideration the most significant
fact—arbitrariness of transitions (6).
Actually, the collection (ν1, . . .), as a final result of transitions {Ψ 99K αs}, ‘knows nothing’
about their left hand side, much less about its uniqueness Ψ. If, for instance, we would
require ? = Ψ under equal α-statistics {νs} for the two families {? 99K αs}N and {Ψ 99K αs}N
(collectivity of ?’s), that would mean a mass control over transitions (9). Instead of a ‘black
box’ above, we find that prior to acts
A
99K all the ?’s were equal to Ψ. This, however, is the
declaration of a property: ‘prior to observation the system S was/dwelled in . . . ’. With any
continuation of this sentence, it is pointless and prohibited, if it is theoretically accepted that
prior to observation nothing exists and there are no properties (sect. 2.1). The indeterminacy
of the ingoing ?’s is therefore mandatory, and numbers (ν1, ν2, . . .) required for recognition are
apparently insufficient. Since the micro-changeability of single primitives Ψ means nothing
[5], [7, p. 493], [88, p. 419(!), left column], only a generic ensemble
{? · · · ?} ֌ {· · ·Ψ · · ·ΨΦ · · ·ΦΘ · · ·Θ · · ·} =: A (16)
can be the intermediary in the sought-for translation of Ψ ∈ T onto representations |Ξ〉 ∈ H,
when constructing (11).
In the accustomed physics terminology, the above is expressed in the sequence
state
Aquant
999999K state′ 7→ measurement. (17)
The removal of the intermediate component here, i. e., switch to the sequence
state
Aclass
999999K · · · · · · 7→ measurement, (18)
amounts to the rejection of micro-destructibility and of unpredictability. Even with the
classical consideration, this supposition is questionable, since the notion of ‘change when
observed’ disappears. The relationships between the dual concepts—(micro/macro)-scopicity,
big/middle/small, etc—are also lost. That is the reason why, strictly speaking,
• all observations, regardless of (envisioned physical) macro/meso/micro character-
istics, have the structure (17), i. e., are the quantum observations. No non-quantal
observations exist.
With their idealized ‘roughening’, the classical description appends numeric ν-statistics to
(18), which is when the left/right parts of (18) become indistinguishable with respect to the
arrow symbols. The arrows may then be replaced with the equivalence
state
Aclass
L9999999999K {ν-statistics numbers}. (19)
Supplementing the right hand side here with the concept of spectral values {αs} for all of the
observables A = A(q, p) (or for phase observables {q1, q2, . . . ; p1, p2, . . .}), this side will turn
into an exhaustive numerical realization of the left hand side. Criterion ≈, then, turn into
the R-numeric equality = of all the A -statistics or into an equality of phase distributions
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̺(q1, . . . ; p1, . . .). This is a situation of the classical (statistical) physics (ClassPhys), i. e.,
when ‘the physics is identified’ with certain numeric quantities from the outset. The ill-
posedness of such a situation is discussed further below at greater length in sects. 6.4, 6.5,
and 7. In both these cases, distinguishability 6≈ depends on the concept of α-states.
Remark 4. From this point onward, by state we will strictly mean representations (11). So it makes
no sense to speak of transitions between states in this case, much less of “transition from possible to
actual” (Everett [17, p. 189]) [125, 73, 160]. The writing |Ξ〉 99K |α〉 and its typical the wave function
collapse interpretation are not correct. In fact, in treating transition |Ξ〉 99K |α1〉 as a state-to-state
destruction, its left hand side cannot carry any information about ν(A )-frequencies for other events
|Ξ〉 99K |αs〉, much less about amount of destruction from envisioned B-observations |Ξ〉
B
99K |β〉.
Such ‘ν(B)-amounts’ are always present at standard comprehension of the |Ξ〉-symbol. For this reason,
the concept of a state should not be used as a correct term at all [94]; the terminology, however, has
been settled.
The motivation given above—S (system, primitives), O (observation) and R (representa-
tions), T (taboo), the semantic principia I (QM-statics) and II (numbers)—is sufficient for
further creating the basis of mathematical formalism of QM. These tenets should hardly be
considered as postulates, at least in the common meaning of the phrase ‘postulates of a phys-
ical theory’, since they are of a naturally language nature, and are, as we believe, the points
of departure for reasonings whatever the approach to the micro-world. As it was emphasized
above, these principles do not stipulate for pre-determined mathematics and physics, with
the exception of an already well-established metamathematical and linguistic understand-
ing [79, 118] of how to approach the mathematical axioms, structures, theories, and their
interpretations altogether. See also Remarks 7 and 10, and sects. 5, 10.
3. Ensemble formations
Your acquaintance with reality grows
literally by buds or drops of perceptions.
. . . they come totally or not at all
W. James
The key corollary of the macro-paradigm (12) is not merely the appearance of numeric
data in the theory, but also the fact that the further construct must rely not on isolated
primitives, but on their aggregates being considered as an integrated whole, i. e., as a set.
This causes a choice for the ensemble notation.
3.1. Mixtures of ensembles. Returning to the analysis of transitions ? 99K αs, one gets
that the lower row in (12) comes actually from indeterminacy
{α1}n1 {α2}n2 · · · · · ·
9
9
K
9
9
K
9
9
K
9
9
K
9
9
K
· · · ? · · · ? · · · ? · · · · · ·
and, thus, (12) should be replaced with the scheme
{· · ·Ψ · · ·Φ · · ·Θ · · ·}
A
9
9
K
9
9
K
9
9
K
9
9
K
9
9
K A{
· · ·α1 · · ·α2 · · ·
} , (20)
wherein the composition of the upper ingoing row may not be predetermined. Fundamentally,
according to (17) it may not be withdrawn from (20), yet at the same time the meaning of the
row can in no way be aligned with the adjective ‘observable’ via typical empirical/physical
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words: properties, readings, quantities/amounts, and other ‘observable’ characteristics. Such
a non-detectability is the equivalent of that a box may be prepended to the scheme (6):
· · · · · · 99 Ψ
A
999 α. (21)
If β’s serve as Ψ in (21), then we have the schemes of precedence and of continuation:
· · · · · ·
A
999 α
B
999 β or · · · · · ·
B
999 β
A
999 α.
Let an observer capture the fact of any distinguishability in the intermediate A . Section 2.1
tells us that this may be only the distinguishability of objects {α1, α2, . . .}; hence, this very
A turns into an observation (pt. O). The M-paradigm then gives rise to the numbers of α-
events (n1, n2, . . .) and, thereupon, their relative frequencies (w1, w2, . . .) by the rule (14). If
subsequently micro-observations B are to follow, then a composite macro-observation B ◦A
has been formed, and frequencies {wj} cannot but impact on statistical characteristics of
these later B-observation’s micro-events. However, being an ingoing ensemble for B, each
homogeneous {αs · · ·αs}ns is indistinguishable from an indefinite ensemble {· · ·Ψ · · ·Φ · · ·}ns ,
since the concept of ‘≈A -sameness’ is unknown for B. Instrument B is ‘aware of only its
own ≈B and cannot know what it destroys’
∗, or that the source-object consists of one and
the same αs. According to pts. O and M, an instrument produces nothing more than its own
‘destruction list’; in this case ({β1}m1 , {β2}m2 , . . .). This list is completely independent of
the other ones, since, according to pt. R(••), there can not be restrictions on TA and TB. In
case the set {αs · · ·αs}ns transits into collection {βk · · · βk}ns , this means that αs has always
transited into one and the same βk every time (under the convention Σ → ∞), and there
takes place merely a coincidence αs = βk of eigen-primitives in the lists TA and TB.
If B ◦ A is proceeded with a third observation C , the preceding analysis is repeated
recursively with the same result; only the values {wj} will be changed. As a result, only the
following two ingoing types for macro-scheme (20) are conceivable:{
· · ·Ψ · · ·Φ · · ·Θ · · ·
} indefinite ensemble
(no statistics),
(22)
{
{· · ·Ψ · · ·Φ · · ·}(w1){· · ·Ψ · · ·Φ · · ·}(w2) · · ·
} ensemble mixture
(with statistics (w1, w2, . . .)).
(23)
It is reasonable to regard case (23) as a mixture of the system A -preparations {S (w1), S (w2),
. . . }, to each of which we assign the number 0 < ws < 1, referred to as its statistical
weight. These weights are all that is inherited from the preparation A , and subsequent
micro-observation acts B are performed on indefinite ensembles (22) again. It is clear that
in the view of transitions 99K in scheme (20), this situation is a derivative of (22), and this
very type (22) is crucial [13, p. 53]. In other words, if preparation is considered a concept as
essential as observation (pt. O), we still remain within the framework of the primary essence
of a transition:
Ψ
B
999K β, α
B
999K β.
Its left hand side should always be seen as an undetermined primitive, even though we
treat/call it preparatory (micro)observation. See also “preparation-measurement reciprocity”
in [15].
∗Rejection of this point brings us once again (p. 9) to attempts at penetrating into the ‘black box’ of
transitions (5), i. e., to attempts at creating the physics of a more primary level.
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3.2. Ensemble brace. According to pts. R and M, representations (11) must reflect all
information about physics of the problem: primitives/incomes, transitions (‘arrows’ 99K), and
outgoing statistics. All that data are contained in scheme (20), which is why the maximum
that the model of a future mathematical object, which characterizes everything we get while
watching the S, can rely on is the ensemble brace:

Ξ

 :=

{· · ·Ψ · · ·Φ · · ·Θ · · ·}
A
9
9
K
9
9
K
9
9
K
9
9
K
9
9
K A{
· · ·α1 · · ·α2 · · ·
}
 (24)
(or a couple of ensemble bunches). It is immediately seen that (24) carries the radical
difference between situation (17) and its ‘roughening’ (19); because of the upper row. The
enormous arbitrariness within the brace and arrows
A
99K is ‘programmed’ to give birth to the
different processing rules of statistics and to effects typical for QM. Thanks to maximality of
(24), it has been just this row which encodes all the sought-for cases of distinguishability 6≈.
In particular, by varying the upper row, while the lower one remains unchanged, we get into a
situation, when α-statistics (ν1, ν2, . . .) turns out to be the same for

Ξ

 and

Ξ˜

, meanwhile,

Ξ

 6≈

Ξ˜

.
The further problem is thus as follows. With the indefinite A-ensemble (16) in hand, i. e.,
with the upper row of (24), is it possible, based on the principles described above, to bring
the still incomplete relation 6≈ to the maximal quantum-physical distinguishability of states?
4. Why domain C comes into being?
. . . quod ideo sint imaginariae, . . .
quod ideo sint . . . tum certe forent
reales ideoque non imaginariae∗
L. Euler (1736)
The first priority, in the 6≈-distinguishability of objects (24), is to separate the closest and
unconditional criterion—the outgoing α-statistics. To do this, let us split the lower row into
families
{
{α1}∞1{α2}∞2 · · ·
}
, where
∞1 +∞2 + · · · =∞, (25)
and, subsequently (rather than the reverse, otherwise (23)), taking into account the arbitrari-
ness of ‘arrows’, we also split the upper row:

Ξ

=

{
{· · ·Ψ · · ·Φ · · ·}∞1 {· · ·Ψ · · ·Φ · · ·}∞2 · · ·
}
9
9
K
9
9
K
9
9
K
9
9
K
9
9
K
9
9
K
9
9
K
9
9
K{
{α1 · · · · · ·α1}∞1 {α2 · · · · · ·α2}∞2 · · ·
}
 (26)
(the indication of observation
A
99K is omitted further below, since it has been reflected in
primitives α). Hereafter, infinities ∞j stand for cardinal numbers (a number of elements,
possibly finite) of their own ensembles. Therefore extension of distinguishability (15) should
be produced from comparison of the sub-objects like
{· · ·Ψ · · ·Φ · · ·}∞19
9
K
9
9
K
9
9
K
9
9
K
{α1 · · · · · ·α1}∞1
(27)
that differ from each other in the upper row composition.
∗ . . . this is why they are imaginary. Were they . . . they would certainly be real and therefore not imaginary.
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4.1. Continuum of quantum phases. Cardinality of the T-set cannot be finite. This
would entail finitely many α-primitives for all kinds of instruments. But finiteness of this
number N would mean an exclusivity of its value that does not follows from anywhere. At
the same time, all the A-ensembles (16) are subsets of the set T (boolean 2T); any finite
portion of it is ruled out. Hence, the infinite variety of upper rows in (27) is uncountable.
Aside from numeric ν-statistics, the program R does also require an association of the
numeric objects with each row
A = {· · ·Ψ · · ·ΨΦ · · ·ΦΘ · · ·Θ · · ·}∞ ⇐⇒ · · · ,
because primitive’s symbols must disappear in the ultimate description. In order to avoid
introducing the structures ad hoc, we will produce numbers here in the same manner, in
which statistics were producing in sect. 2.5. Indeed, the logical genesis of the concept of
a number must be single in theory. That is, taking into account the presence of copies of
primitives, one may write
· · · ⇐⇒
{
{Ψ′}∞′{Ψ
′′}∞′′ · · ·
}
, (28)
and numbers per se will come into being by the Σ-convention like (14). Thus, on the one side,
the discreteness of micro-transition acts is embodied in (28) with the sequence (Ψ′,Ψ′′, . . .),
and on the other, the uncountability of micro-arbitrariness is inherited by attaching the
symbolic ‘quantities’—‘countless’ characters (∞′, ∞′′, . . . )—to elements of this sequence.
The global discreteness says that there are no grounds to assume a more than countable
infinity ℵ0 for the set T, i. e., |T| = ℵ0. The infinity of the family (28), hence, has the type
2ℵ0 = ℵ,
i. e., it is continual [82]. Which possibilities exist for the form of row (28)?
The trivial case A =
{
{Ψ′}∞′
}
for (28) drops out at once, since element Ψ′ would always
go into the one and the same primitive:
{Ψ′ · · · · · ·Ψ′}∞19
9
K
9
9
K
9
9
K
9
9
K
{α1 · · · · · ·α1}∞1
=
{Ψ′}∞1
A
9
9
K ···
9
9
K A
{α1}∞1
.
But this is tantamount to the identity Ψ′ ≡ α1, which robs of any meaning the concept of
transition
A
99K whatsoever. Hence, for each of the formations (28), the following options are
admissible:{
{Ψ′}∞′{Ψ
′′}∞′′
︸ ︷︷ ︸
N=2
}
, . . . ,
{
{Ψ′}∞′{Ψ
′′}∞′′ {Ψ
′′′}∞′′′ · · ·
︸ ︷︷ ︸
36N<∞
}
, . . .
. . . ,
{
{Ψ′}∞′{Ψ
′′}∞′′ {Ψ
′′′}∞′′′ · · ·
︸ ︷︷ ︸
N=∞
}
(29)
with minimal N = 2. If some of the infinities (∞′,∞′′, . . .) are finite here (or even countable),
this does not change the total continuality ℵ. The extreme case N = ∞—a countable
infinity of continuums—changes also no this count because of ℵ + ℵ + · · · = ℵ [68]. All of
these infinities may be even countably duplicated, without augmenting the continuum, since
ℵ · ℵ · · · = ℵℵ0 = ℵ.
We will think of all the brace (27) as indistinguishable in their patterns, i. e., only one of
the schemes (29) is realized. This fixes a structure staticity of the theory, because, otherwise,
it is unclear why one (unrecognizable upper) row should differ from another in the number
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(what?) of defining primitives {Ψ′,Ψ′′, . . .} (which ones?). By analogy with (14), the only
way to implement the said above is the introducing the cardinals as
κ′ :=
∞′
∞
, κ′′ :=
∞′′
∞
, κ′′′ :=
∞′′′
∞
, . . . . (30)
Remark 5. A few remarks may be made in connection with case N = ∞. It is related to a
conglomerate of infinities, which has the form of discretely infinite family of continual infinities {κ′,
κ′′, . . . }, and things would have been even ‘worse’, if staticity of one of the schemes (29) would be
changed to variability. Such formations would need to be equipped with topology and with associated
concepts of convergence and of limit. But all this touches on principally unobservable numeric entities,
for which it is not clear how to motivate the further reductions to a ‘finite mathematics’ as required:
dimensions, finite approximations, finite numbers (which ones?), etc. Moreover, all of that would
pertain only to the global structure parameters of the theory prior to constructing it per se, not to
mention the physical models. To put it plainly, such an assumption would result not to a theory but
to a theory of theories and so on ad infinitum which should be somewhere terminated in any way. For
these reasons, we leave the case N = ∞ aside, though it might be worth elaborating it. However, in
sect. 7.6, we will give a further justification of that the numeric domain of the theory is just what it
has already been known in QM.
By examining non-minimal options N = 3, N = 4, . . . , we conclude that they should be
dismissed, since there immediately arises an issue associated with the questionable empirical
exclusivity of a certain ‘world integer N ’, which characterizes the number of ‘physically
inaccessible’ Ψ-objects. That is, these options would be topologically related to a certain
nontrivial dimension N > 3 with unmotivated origin.
For the remaining case N = 2 one establishes that, in the following writing
{Ψ′ · · ·Ψ′}∞′1 ∪ {Ψ
′′ · · ·Ψ′′}∞′′1
99K
99K
99K {α1 · · ·α1}∞1
of the scheme (27), none of the primitives Ψ′, Ψ′′ may coincide with α1. Otherwise, the
unrestricted adjunction of identical transitions α1 99K α1 to (27) would mean indeterminacy
of both the number κ1 and the actual statistics (ν1, ν2, . . .).
Not counting the ‘extremely complex’ case N = ∞, the only option N = 2 remains. It
should have been adopted even before, on the ground that the most minimalistic construction,
which set-theoretically gives rise, as a minimum, to the minimal numerical object—a single
number—corresponds to the minimal N = 2 in (29). The maximal case is problematic, while
mid-ones are ruled out. Consequently, all possible assumptions regarding the upper row
structure in (27) are indistinguishable from a case just as if the row contained two primitives
only. Functionality of the symbol ∪, having regard to inclusion of copies Ψ′ and Ψ′′, is
unchanged as is; see further sect. 5.1 below.
We now take into account that each of the numbers (30) is mathematically generated by the
standard scheme: {(ordered) integers} ֌ {(ordered) rationals} ֌ {(ordered) continuum}.
The natural ordering < is always present here and, as is well known [141, p. 52], can be
isomorphically represented by the set-theoretic inclusion ⊂ on a certain system of sets. This
inclusion, in turn, is directly concerned with the semantics of sect. 2. The natural-language
term ‘accumulating’—‘the old is being nested into the new’—is formalized into the creating
of sets from ensembles (see sect. 5.1).
We now conclude that all kinds of schemes (27) form an ℵ-continuum, for which there is no
reasonable rationale for equipping it with a topology other than the standard order topology
of the 1-dimensional real R-axis or its equivalents. Call the quantity κ ∈ R quantum phase.
It should be added, that in considering the two upper rows (27) as infinite sets
{Ψ · · ·Ψ}∞′ ∪ {Φ · · ·Φ}∞′′ and {Ψ · · ·Ψ}∞˜′ ∪ {Φ · · ·Φ}∞˜′′ ,
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one can always establish their formal identity. However, physics requires to distinguish the
rows, which is what the numeric part of pt. R and comparison of cardinals (∞′, ∞′′) ‘serve’.
4.2. Statistics + phases. Thus the closest reconciliation of scheme (26) with the R(•)-
postulate is an ensemble brace of the form

Ξ

=

{
{Ψ}∞′1{Φ}∞′′1
}
9
9
K
9
9
K
9
9
K
9
9
K
{α1 · · · · · ·α1}∞1
{
{Ψ}∞′2{Φ}∞′′2
}
9
9
K
9
9
K
9
9
K
9
9
K
{α2 · · · · · ·α2}∞2
· · · · · ·
· · · · · ·
 (31)
followed by the (upper) continual numeration through R-numbers
κs :=
∞′s
∞s
(∞s :=∞
′
s +∞
′′
s ). (32)
In other words, quantitative description in the theory is created on a basis of the minimal
building bricks 
{
{Ψ}∞′{Φ}∞′′
}
9
9
K
9
9
K
9
9
K
9
9
K
{α · · · · · ·α}∞
 (unitary brace) (33)
with two abstract ingoing primitives.
Now, we have cardinals connected by relation (25) and the structure (31)–(32). In the
above-described context, parentheses { } and symbols Ψ, Φ, 99K no longer carry meaning at
this point. Therefore, we may omit them as ‘extraneous’ and write (31) as

Ξ

 ⇐⇒
κ1
∞1
∣∣∣∣ κ2∞2
∣∣∣∣ · · ·· · ·
 = · · · ,
where αs are well represented by a subscripted numeration; observation A has been fixed so
far. Let us now introduce a statistics from the ‘embracing infinity’ (25):
· · · =
 κ1
ν1 · ∞
∣∣∣∣ κ2ν2 · ∞
∣∣∣∣ · · ·· · ·
 = κ1
ν1
∣∣∣∣ κ2ν2
∣∣∣∣ · · ·· · ·

· ∞
, νs :=
∞s
∞
.
Then, by Σ-postulate, one arrives at a continually numerical labeling of objects (31):

Ξ

 ⇐⇒
{(κ1
ν1
)
,
(κ2
ν2
)
, . . .
}
.
Recall that the arithmetical operations on the emergent pairs (ν,κ) are still out of the
question, and Σ-limit does not care the ‘innards’ of

Ξ

. Only one of all the potentially infinite
quantities tends to infinity: the total cardinality (25) of brace (31). What is remained ‘non-
extraneous’ in (31) is α’s, and we return them to their place. Hence, from the viewpoint of
observation A , the aggregate of all the possible brace (24) is indistinguishable from an order-
indifferent 2-parametric family of data

Ξ

=
{(κ1
ν1
)
α1,
(κ2
ν2
)
α2, . . .
}
. (34)
We drop a lower bar in the symbolic designation

Ξ

, highlighting the fact that the meaning
of the

Ξ

-object becomes increasingly divorced from primitives in pt. S and gets into the
numeric domain to match the programme R.
As an outcome, despite the freedom of ingoing collection in (26) and quantum micro-
arbitrariness, the distinguishability

Ξ

 6≈

Ξ˜

 is indeed determinable, it is determinable not
only by statistics and is the (R × R)-numerical:

Ξ

 6≈

Ξ˜

, if (νs, κs) 6= (ν˜s, κ˜s). (35)
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What is more, the preliminary (classical) 6≈-criterium (15) fits in (34)–(35) as a particular
case by omitting the κ-numbers and middle link from (17). That is to say, the ignoring
of quantum ‘κ-effects’ is only possible via the (3 7→ 2)-reduction (17) into (18), with an
automatic imposition of the ClassPhys description. A simplified and hypothetical version of
QM over R1 is also ruled out. It would mean a reduction of the two numbers (ν,κ) to a single
one. But they have fundamentally different origin. The construct and reasoning in sect. 2.1
tell also us that the attempt at a greater ‘quantum specification’ to (5) and (17) is impossible
by virtue of the 2-row structure—ingoing/outgoing—of the object

Ξ

, and distinguishability
by numeric pairs (35) is highest possible.
The

Ξ

-objects (34) remain and they, as a family, exhaustively inherit the problem’s
physics. The quantities νs are the really observable (unitless) numbers—the percentage quan-
tity of events, which an instrument/observer declares to be distinguishable α-objects. The
quantities κs are the internal and unremovable degrees of freedom. Figuratively speaking,
the κ’s may be speculatively referred to as phases, but they may not be associated with
an actual quantity of something. Not only is any ‘material’ treatment of these ‘amounts’
impossible, but it is fundamentally prohibited, since the converse would have meant endowing
the ‘nonexistent boxes’ (5)–(6) with a notional content or asserting the nature of their origin.
Justification is only allowed here for the fact of their existence, which is reflected by presence
of the left hand side in the concept of transition Ψ
A
99K α (Remark 2).
In view of numerous and ongoing discussions of the meaning of the quantum state, note
that any its (even merely similar) classical/ontological and causal ‘visualization mechanisms’
[132, p. 137] as wave function of a ‘certain objective matter’, of a hypothetical observable, or
of the ‘classical data’ (whatever that means) are—and this we stress with emphasis—pointless
for the same reason. See also sect. 10.1. This is why
• it is impossible [43, p. 13] to make/prepare, observe, transmit or measure a state,
or endow it with the property of being known/unknown, or physically recognize/
distinguish it from another.
This thesis has no undergone a change even with regard to the word ‘statistics’ in the Born
rule [24], if only because the rule is a substantial—two-to-one—reduction of the (κ, ν)-data.
The state will itself, when created as a mathematical object, determine the meaning of the
mentioned words (see sect. 5.3) with an appropriate concept of the physical distinguishability
(sect. 2.4). Cf. the works [95, 117] and the “methods to directly measure general quantum
states . . . by weak measurements” in [96].
All the κs and νs are independent of each other, except for relation ν1 + ν2 + · · · = 1.
Taking into account the admissible renormalization of both R-numbers, the pair (ν,κ) can
be topologically identified with a point on the complex plane:(κ
ν
)
⇄ (λ, µ) ∈ R2 =: C.
The issue of the numerical domain over which the quantum description is being done—the
real R, complex C, the quaternions Q or whatever—is non-trivial and continues to be the
subject of study [1, 8, 92]. The complexity C is often motivated by a quantum dynamics
(Schro¨dinger’s equation) [72, p. 132, Stueckelberg], [142], however, such a motivation is in-
consistent, and as we have seen, there is no need for it. The rigidity of the C-domain points
to the fact that, in particular, the quaternion QM also has no place to originate from [7,
sect. 10.1], although it was the object of theoretical constructs in the 1960–70’s [50]. Note
that even the most comprehensive works [92, p. 217], [72, p. 131], [19, p. 234], [20] observe a
difficulty in the full substantiation of the C-domain.
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5. Empiricism and mathematics
Set theory does not seem today to have
. . . organic interrelationship with physics
P. Cohen & R. Hersh [32, p. 116]
. . . physics has something to say about
the foundations of mathematics . . .
“if we believe in ZF there is nothing
for physics to say” is not right
P. Benioff [56, p. 31]
Up to this point we have dealt, roughly speaking, with a single abstract aggregate

Ξ


isolated from the others. However, the constructional nature of the ensemble brace (31)
entails the following closedness relation between them. Every brace

Ξ

 is composed of some
others in infinitely many ways (for remote analogies, see [4, sect. 11.2]), i. e., it is a union

Ξ

=

Ξ′

∪

Ξ′′

, (36)
and, to put it in reverse, any union of two brace is a third object-brace. In collections (36),
the operation ∪, which generates them, is commutative and associative:
A ∪B = B ∪A, A ∪ (B ∪ C) = (A ∪B) ∪ C, (37)
and these 2- and 3-term relations not only are not a formal supplement, but should be read
as the structural properties in general.
5.1. Union of ensembles. Consider the lower α-rows of brace (26) and experimental form-
ing the new real α-ensembles from them. Let the procedure of such forming be denoted by
U(A,B, . . .), where (A,B, . . .) are the ensembles per se. Its essence is such that it is com-
prehensively determined by the following minimum: a rule that involves the minimal (i. e.,
two) number of arguments U(A,B) = 〈?〉 and a rule of the repeated applying U to itself:
U(U(. . .), . . .) = 〈?〉. Obviously, we should write
U(A,B) = U(B,A), U
(
A,U(B,C)
)
= U
(
U(A,B), C
)
, (38)
which is of course merely the empirical rephrasing the standard properties (37) of operation ∪.
However, the converse is logically preferable: empiricism (38) is formalized into the abstract
properties (37). If we now attach the upper ‘quantum’ primitives to the low α-rows—a
requirement of sect. 2.1—then the operationality of actions with the resulting

Ξ

-braces
would be just like that of U, i. e., (38). In other words, we carry over properties (38) (and
use them everywhere) to the general operation on

Ξ

-brace, without distinguishing between
the essences of symbols ∪ and U. ‘Micro-operationality’ of empiricism and its formalization
are confined, at most, by the rules (37) and (38).
Let us temporarily discontinue using the numerical terminology as applied to

Ξ

-objects.
They differ from each other due to relationships between their ‘innards’, rather than because
of our assignment of symbols [λ, µ] to them. The brace are comprised of elements that are
combined into sets and are added to them. In the language of an abstract logic, we are dealing
with the fact that transitions x form the brace A, B, . . . , i. e., they are in the membership
relationships x ∈ A, x ∈ B, . . . or, when accumulated as micro-acts, ‘get belonged to them’.
That is to say, the brace themselves and their formation (accumulation of statistics for the Σ-
limit) are equivalent to a huge number of propositional ‘micro-sentences x ∈ A or x ∈ B or
. . . ’. However, again, this is nothing but a logically formal equivalent of the union operation ∪:
A ∪B =
{
x
∣∣ (x ∈ A) ∨ (x ∈ B)}, (39)
which is already being constantly exploited above.
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Remark 6. As is well known [141, 82], due to properties of logical atoms ∈ (membership) and ∨
(or), the properties of sentences like (39) are determined precisely by rules (37) for ∪. Technically, we
should also take an idempotence A∪A = A into account, however. At the same time, the need to have
a number requires that the duplicates in ensembles have to be taken into consideration. Nevertheless,
this situation is easily simulated by the set theory itself. Indeed, consider first the lower row in (24)
as a strictly abstract set {α′, α′′, . . .} ⊂ T. Then, instrument A ‘asserts’ the distinguishable elements
{α1, α2, . . .} and those that should be thought of as their equivalents:
α′1 ≈ α
′′
1 ≈ · · · =: α1 , α
′
2 ≈ α
′′
2 ≈ · · · =: α2 , . . . .
This equivalence can be characterized, say, by words ‘a detector click at one and the same place α1’.
Upon such a formalization, one obtains the formation {α′1α
′′
1 · · ·}{α
′
2α
′′
2 · · ·} · · · ≈ {α1 · · ·}{α2 · · ·}
· · ·, i. e., the very lower row in (26). It is within this context that we think of the union operation
without falling into contradiction. Accordingly,

Ξ

∪

Ξ

 6=

Ξ

but the standard symbol ∪ continues
to be used for simplicity.
Therefore if we get back to the numerical labels (34), but ignore the ‘inner composition‘
of

Ξ

, i. e., the M-paradigm, thus excluding ∪ and (37) from the reasoning, then all kinds
of

Ξ

-objects would turn into the semantically ‘segregated ideograms’. Micro-transitions,
their mass nature, arbitrariness, 6≈-distinguishability, and the quantumness of the task at all
simply disappear. To take an illustration, the obvious statement
the brace {Ψ
A
99K α} =:

Ξ

 has an empirical relationship
with its duplication {Ψ
A
99K α,Ψ
A
99K α} =:

Ξ′


becomes pointless, because the property

Ξ

∪

Ξ

=

Ξ′

 is missing. This is despite the fact
that the creation of the transition copies in

Ξ′

 is a primary operation for generating the
objects and reasoning at all. Construction of the theory would then become possible only with
the interpretative introduction of the vanished concepts anew. Therefore macro-empiricism
necessitates that the relationships (37) be operative rules, and with that the quantumness or
classicality of consideration is of no significance.
Remark 7. Let us look at the situation on the opposite—mathematical—side. The union of sets ∪
is a fundamental operation already at the level of the set-theoretic formalization; e. g., the Zermelo–
Fraenkel (ZF) axioms [82]. This is one of the first ways on how to create sets—the axiom of union. So
if we believe in the set-theoretic mode of explaining/creating the quantum rudiments, the quantitative
description will inevitably invoke operationality of the mathematical primitive ∪ through rules (37).
This would be suffice to declare,
• inasmuch as we have nothing but ∪ and

Ξ

(taboo T), commutativity/associativity of theory
is then postulated at the outset, with the subsequent carrying these structures over to
numeric representations, i. e., to R or C.
It is preferable, however, to adhere to the sequence order in ideology more stringently—{observation
֌ mathematics}, {empiricism ֌ numeric representation}, without substitution it for the opposite.
At least, if we rely upon the following comprehension of the empiricism: our elementary perceptions
are formalized only into sets and set-theoretic ∪-abstraction (39). See also [94, Ch. 3], [56, p. 178],
[71, p. 323], [28], [31, pp. 12, 86, Ch. 4], sect. 11.1, and [20].
Summing up, we detect a kind of a junction point: the physical and mathematical funda-
mentality of operation ∪ for describing the elementary acts. That is to say, the mathematics
of

Ξ

-brace (31) and of objects (34) may not inherently be exhausted by them as ‘bare’ sets
without structures. Recalling now pr. II, we draw a conclusion regarding the very construction
of the theory.
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• Reconciliation of the R-paradigm with empiricism must transform itself into rewrit-
ing the primary ensemble ∪-constructions (26), (31), (33), and relationships be-
tween them into the language of numeric symbols.
More formally, we have the following continuation of pt. R(•).
R+ Homomorphism of the ensemble brace properties ‘onto numbers’ : mutual ∪-rela-
tionships (37) between the

Ξ

-brace should be carried over to relations between
their numeric

Ξ

-representations (34).
Thereby, we once again fix the maximum that is available for the construction of quantum
mathematics. One may handle only the ∪-aggregates of transitions—constructions (31),
(34)—and the minimal modules (33).
5.2. Semigroup. In line with (36), let us split the unitary brace (33) into two ones or
combine two brace into one. Remove also the symbols of primitives Ψ and Φ from there. As
was pointed out above, they are not necessary at this stage. Replacing the notation of upper
cardinals (33) with pairs (∞′1,∞′2) and (∞′′1 ,∞′′2 ), upon the union one obtains
(∞′1,∞
′
2) ∪ (∞
′′
1 ,∞
′′
2 ) = (∞
′
1 +∞
′′
1 ,∞
′
2 +∞
′′
2 ). (40)
Here, addition + obviously satisfies the properties (37). If the cardinal ‘∞-coordinates’ are
replaced with the ‘finite percentages’ (κ,S) introduced above, i. e., if one puts{
κ =
∞1
∞1 +∞2
, S =∞1 +∞2
}
,
{
∞1 = κS, ∞2 = (1− κ)S
}
(41)
as in (32), then rule (40) acquires the form of a number composition:
(κ′,S′) ◦ (κ′′,S′′) =
(
κ′S′ + κ′′S′′
S′ +S′′
, S′ +S′′
)
. (42)
The commutativity/associativity properties of operation ◦ hold here due to birationality of
(41). Then, the formal application of Σ-postulate, i. e., S′ +S′′ →∞, breaks, however, the
symmetry ′ ↔ ′′ and associativity of ◦, since
(κ′,S′) ◦ (κ′′,S′′) ֌ κ′ ◦ κ′′ = s · κ′ + (1− s) · κ′′ , s :=
S′
S′ +S′′
, (43)
where s is an undefined parameter. Consequence of the same kind holds also true for the ν-
components of pairs (34), for which a convex w-combination of statistics does arise:
(ν ′1, ν
′
2, . . .) ◦ (ν
′′
1 , ν
′′
2 , . . .) =: (ν
′
◦ ν ′′) = w · ν ′ + (1− w) · ν ′′ , w :=
Σ′
Σ′ +Σ′′
. (44)
At the same time, the splitting (40) is no more than an ‘intrinsic reshuffle’ of one and
the same

Ξ

-brace that ‘knows nothing’ about concept of a number (numbers s, w), much
less about the concept of observation or its numeric form. Therefore mathematics of the
ensemble structures should be independent of any representation for (36) by operations like
(42). Composition

Ξ′

◦

Ξ′′

=

Ξ

 should be determined solely by its constituents (ν ′,κ′)
and (ν ′′,κ′′).
Remark 8. In classical statistics, the foregoing has an analog as insensitivity of data on events to
the way of their gathering and of layout; for example, (2, 3) + (1, 4) ≡ (0, 6) + (3, 1) ≡ · · · =: data.
Then, the observation proper is being created by the scheme data֌ (3, 7) 7→
(
3
3+7
, 7
3+7
)
= (0.3, 0.7) =
(ν1, ν2) =: observ. Parameters like w can appear in

Ξ

 only if, prior to any of the ∪-unions (36),
a construction like (23) has been fixed. That is, the invariantly number-free brace (36) has been
supplemented by an external number w and ratiow : (1−w). The correction

Ξ

֌
{
Ξ′

(w),

Ξ′′

(1−w)
}
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of the theory, related to this number and to arrays (23), is very well known. This is a w-statistical
mixture {(w;ψ′), (1 − w;ψ′′)} of wave functions, accompanied by a formalization in terms of the
statistical operator w · |ψ′〉〈ψ′|+ (1− w) · |ψ′′〉〈ψ′′|.
Now, in order that numeric (ν,κ)-realization (34) of ensemble brace (31) inherits quantum
empiricism (O, M) and structure properties (36)–(37) correctly, we reassign the quantities
(ν,κ) with a ‘percentage meaning’ and replace them with different numbers [λ, µ]:

Ξ

=
{[
µ1
λ1
]
α1 ,
[
µ2
λ2
]
α2, . . .
}
(45)
(this important passage will be touched upon once again in sect. 7.1). In so doing, each
pair
[
µ′
λ′
]
,
[
µ′′
λ′′
]
behaves as a whole, and, under coinciding αs, the pairs are endowed with a
composition
[
µ′
λ′
]
⊕
[
µ′′
λ′′
]
that is to be commutative. Along with this, if symbol ⊎ denotes a
composition of objects (45) then it should obviously copy properties (37):

Ξ

⊎

Ψ

=

Ψ

⊎

Ξ

,

Ξ

⊎
(
Ψ

⊎

Φ


)
=
(
Ξ

⊎

Ψ


)
⊎

Φ

.
The finite ensembles are vanishingly small in their contribution into infinite ones (Σ-postu-
late), i. e., elements of the

Ξ

-family, as infinite sets, are considered modulo finite ensembles.
Let us designate their image as

0

, and, due to property

Ξ

⊎

0

 =

Ξ

, it is naturally
referred to as zero. The collection (45) itself has also been formed by the ∪-combining the
ingredients {[µ1
λ1
]
α1 ,
[µ2
λ2
]
α2 , . . .
}
≡
{[µ1
λ1
]
α1
}
∪
{[µ2
λ2
]
α2
}
∪ · · · = · · · ,
and which is why the same symbol ⊎ may be freely used between objects with different αs:
· · · =
{[µ1
λ1
]
α1
}
⊎
{[µ2
λ2
]
α2
}
⊎ · · · .
For the sake of brevity, we omit the redundant curly brackets further, redefining

Ξ


A
:=
[
µ1
λ1
]
α1 ⊎
[
µ2
λ2
]
α2 ⊎ · · · . (46)
As a result, we have had that the set-theoretic prototypes (26)–(27), (31) of states (11)
do invariantly exist in form of all kinds of ∪-decompositions. Thus, in dealing with the only
instrument A , one reveals the following property.
• For each observation A , the set of

Ξ


A
-objects forms an infinite commutative
semigroup G with respect to operation ⊎.
An internal (beyond the observation) nature of

Ξ


A
-objects (46) is characterized
by their commutative superpositions

Ξ′


A
⊎

Ξ′′


A
, which are independent of the
classical composition of observational ν-statistics.
5.3. Measurement. The described above numerical

Ξ

-version of the

Ξ

-brace ∪-phe-
nomenology makes it easy now to preliminarily formalize the concept, the absence of which
deprives the theory of its logical foundation. Namely, measuring statistics by observation A
over S:
QM-measurement :
{
[λ1, µ1], [λ2, µ2], . . .
}
7→ (ν1, ν2, . . .). (47)
That is, the [λ, µ]-collection gets mathematically mapped into the ν-statistics. This is a
maximum of information provided by observation A . The mapping (47) annihilates the pairs
[λ, µ]. Therefore the inheritance/homomorphism of operations ∪ and ⊎ onto anything at all
is eliminated. Upon operation (47), both (κ, ν)-sets and their ∪-unions, ⊎-operations, and
the semigroup G proper disappear. As a result, the distinctive feature subsequently referred
to as superposition will also disappear. The new numbers {νs} may be ‘added up’ only as
required by the different, i. e., classical, rule: forming the convex combinations (44). We note
that the formalization of measurement does not now depend on how the mathematical map
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[λ, µ]֌ (ν) would be further implemented—it is a separate job [24]—or how the t-dynamics
would be introduced.
Remark 9. Incorporation of t-dynamics into the theory is still impossible due to the absence of
mathematics to be applied to instants t1, t2. Accordingly, no physical t-process may correspond to the
mathematical mapping (47), while the known ‘conceptual’ problems with collapses [59, 153, 70, 89, 106]
are, in fact, non-existent [88, 90, 92]. More precisely, they stem from the blurring of meaning which
we typically give to the words ‘states’ (what is that?), ‘ensembles’ (what are they comprised of?),
and ‘collapse’ (of what?). In regard to the latter, the authors of the book [94] speak out in the most
definitive manner—“fairy tales”.
In sect. 2.1, the fundamental premise of the α-symbol-based distinguishability 6≈ was the
foundation of the entire subsequent language. One then observes that measurement or its
outcome will essentially remain a contentless term—“For microsystems nothing can be di-
rectly measured” [91, p. 304]—up until it invokes the concept of a quantum state, i. e., the

Ξ

- and α-objects. Once again it is stressed that the concept of the state must precede the
notion of measurement, and not the other way round.
5.4. Invariance with respect to observations. Up to this point we had had no need
for the matching of observation A with observation B, although it is clear that a descrip-
tion based on a certain specified A will inevitably be non-invariant with respect to the tool
{A ,B, . . .}—‘observation space’—and unacceptable (pt. R) due to the impermissible exclu-
sivity of the set {α1, . . .}. At the same time, we do not have anything but {A ,B, . . .} and
micro-acts (12) (pts. T and M). In the brace, this fact has already been reflected: transitions
A
99K are combined into integrities (24). Logically, however, the

Ξ


A
-,

Ξ


B
-objects are incom-
parable and isolated from each other, as carriers of statistics of different origin. On the other
hand, ‘the same is observed by instrument B, as by instrument A ’. Although this context
has not yet been invoked, without it the application of set-theoretic constructs to physics is
devoid of meaning∗, just like the union of the speeds of an electron and of the Moon into a
set {ve,vM}, with the subsequent creating a certain ‘physical characteristic of this two-body
system’; say, the mean velocity 1
2
(ve + vM).
Thus the global structuredness is required in the set of various

Ξ

-data according to the
context ‘the same, identical’ or its negation. Apparently, this addition implies entities like ‘the
same particle’, ‘in the same preparation/state’, ‘under the same temperature,M-environment
(12)’, ‘the same closed system S’, ‘in the same external field’, ‘in the same interferometer’
with ‘the same detectors/solenoids’, etc [4, 7, 60]; short and generalized notation 〈 S,M, . . .〉 .
All the concepts here, including the state, are physical conventions, yet their formalization
and modeling are required for the creation of a theory (sect. 2.4).
The notion ‘with the same initial data’ falls under the same category, if the intention
is to use the term time t. Again, the very creating the

Ξ

-brace as a set ‘by the piece’ is
from the outset thought (sect. 2.4) of as a creation on the assumption of common 〈 S,M, . . .〉 .
For instance, the A -statistics

Ξ


A
is gathered with ‘the same’ 〈 S,M, . . .〉 as the B-statistics

Ξ


B
. On its part, any variation is sufficient to obtain ‘not the same’, even if we ‘envision it as
null’ in the spirit of the widely known “without in any way disturbing a system” [122, p. 234].
To take an illustration, equipment of interferometer (sect. 6.5) with additional ‘which-slit’
detectors is already at variance with the notion of ‘the same S’. In similar cases, we end up
in situations of type (23), since the detectors cause an α-distinguishability. Notice that the
notions ‘the same’ and ‘distinguishable’ (Remark 2), while antonymous, mutually exclude
∗“The statements of quantum mechanics are meaningful and can be logically combined only if one can
imagine a unique experimental context” [4, p. 115].
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each other. Semantically, one without the other makes no sense, which closely resembles
Bohr’s conception of complementarity [71].
It follows from the above that in order to match A and B, the supra-mathematical cat-
egories 〈 S,M, . . .〉 are required, however, we are only in possession of the ensemble brace

Ξ


A
and

Ξ


B
(pt. T). On the other hand, without joint consideration of the two instru-
ments, i. e., without introducing a mechanism of the mathematical matching

Ξ′


A
⇄

Ξ′


B
,

Ξ′′


A ⇄

Ξ′′


B, . . . , the segregation of the

Ξ

-objects is absolute. (It is clear that the
matching of single micro-events Ψ
A
99K αs and Ψ
B
99K βj is also futile.) It is impossible to
associate physics with the abstractly segregated

Ξ


A
-brace. Otherwise, the solitary object

Ξ


A
, generating nothing more than a statistics provided by the single instrument A , would
yield a description of everything, which is absurd by pt. R(••). The physical contents (to
come) arise precisely through the above-mentioned matching; see sect. 6.4 further below.
As a result, we adopt a kind of the relativity principle analogue: a tenet on the quantum
observational invariance (cf. [156, p. 632] and mathematical analogies [9, 102]).
III Theory should introduce a means of equating the macro-observations (pts. O, M)
by differing instruments {α1, . . .}A 6= {β1, . . .}B under a common (‘the same’) ex-
perimental environment 〈 S,M, . . .〉 (the 3-rd principium of QM-theory).
5.4.1. Semantic closedness and the equal sign =. We are currently returning once again to
sect. 2.1, falling into a situation when the case in hand does not just entail fundamental the-
ory in the form of {math} + {physical ‘bla-bla-bla’}, while, continuing on an informal note,
the mathematics of physics—quantum mathematics—is being created ‘from scratch’. When
constructing this math, it is impossible to forego physical conventions 〈 S,M, . . .〉 , mean-
while, any preliminary and the formal characterization for 〈 S,M, . . .〉 is ruled out. In fact,
the attempts to mathematically formalize the physical context of observation, rather than
observation itself, will not logically manage without another observation, in this case, of the
experimental environment. The semantic cycling is apparent here, and any its mathematiza-
tion will lead to a retrogression of definitions into infinity (“von Neumann catastrophe” [37,
pp. 158–. . . ]). Which is why, once again, the ‘box (6) method’ prohibitions are required. See
also a paragraph containing the capitalized emphasize “cannot in principle” on p. 418 of
the work [88]. Sooner or later, it will have to be declared that mathematics will be created
for the conventions 〈 S,M, . . .〉 , and that this mathematics will be a mathematical model for
this 〈 S,M, . . .〉 . The analogous argument—“mathematics is there to serve physics, and not
the other way round” (L. Hardy [127, p. 242])—has already long been met in the literature
[4, 7, 57]. In connection with the “general contextual models”, see the book [76] (the Va¨xjo¨-
model, “quantum contextuality”) and bibliography therein.
Remark 10. In order to avoid the just mentioned semantic/linguistic closedness—a kind of math-
ematical ‘pathology’ of the physical and natural languages—a description that lays claim to the role
of an unambiguous/rigorous theory requires a careful separation of the object- and meta-languages.
For more detail, see [79, §§14–16], [118, sect. V.1], [141, sect. 3.9]. For this reason, the constructs
should track the blending of the object QM-domain (syntax) and the meta-domain (semantics) and,
more generally, the penetration of extra-linguistic elements of thinking [31] into QM. The notion of
‘the same 〈 S,M, . . .〉 ’, which is intuitive in a natural language, should explicitly be indicated as the
external and fundamental category (pr. III), and its circular re-interpretations/re-translations within
the theory should be banned. That is, re-definition of the ‘sameness 〈 S,M, . . .〉 , identical 〈 S,M, . . .〉 ’
through a word or the equals sign = between some other entities/symbols are forbidden. The physics
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terminology per se (sects. 6.4, 6.5, and 9.1) will become accessible when physical concepts are intro-
duced via the originating—and obligatorily very primitive/ascetic—quantum mechanics language. See
also a selected thesis in sect. 11.1 on p. 61.
It is crucial to immediately note that, in the same manner, the classical description contains
the cited arguments in their entirety. It is easy to convince that such a description also
implies implicitly that which is designated above as 〈 S,M, . . .〉 ; for the physical reasoning
would otherwise be entirely impossible∗.
Remark 11. Here, the situation is similar to the role of the axiom of choice in the ZF-system
[32, 82]. It has been well known for a long time that the axiom is often subconsciously implied [53,
Chs. II, IV]; it can also not be either circumvented or ignored. Another counterexample to ‘infinite
retrogression and circularity’ in logic comes from the very same system. This is a ban on infinite chain
of set memberships ∈ on the left
|| · · · ∈ Xn ∈ · · · ∈ X2 ∈ X1 ∈ X0
(the regularity axiom [∀x ∈ X, x ∩ X 6= ∅] ⇒ [X = ∅]) under permissibility of the infinite (∈)-
continuing to the right:
X0 ∈ X1 ∈ X2 ∈ · · · ∈ Xn ∈ · · · ∈ · · ·
(not rigorously, the infinity axiom) [131, 82].
The obvious parallels here are the famous Russell paradox [53] or a chaos in the computer file
system when the ‘hard links’ from a folder to the parent folder are allowed. Thus the relations ∈
‘downwards’ to the left and necessarily terminates in something, i. e., in a set which contains nothing:
∅ = X0 ∈ · · · ∈ Xn ∈ · · ·. Therefore one needs to give ‘meaning’ to the only set—the empty one ∅.
Incidentally, it is these axioms that guarantee the existence of infinitely many ordinal numbers (103)
and uniqueness of this structure. The ordinals, and numbers at all, have yet to be dealt with further
below in more detail.
All that remains is to add that no theory in physics is feasible without re-calculations of
physical units, of vectors/tensors, without transformations in the fibre add-on’s over mani-
folds, etc. Accordingly, the considerations on invariance and on transformations should be
present in the quantum case as well, but it—which is its principal difference from the classical
case—still lacks the concepts of physical quantities/properties (see sect. 6.4). Therefore such
argumentation may only be applied to those objects that we have at our disposal, i. e., to the

Ξ

-brace. In fact, the renunciation of pr. III would be tantamount to the inability to make
the physics theories whatsoever.
Now, pr. III and the ‘quantum diversity of the reference frames’ A and B require a kind of
factorization of the entire family {

Ξ


A
,

Ξ


B
, . . . ,

Ξ

′
A
,

Ξ

′
B
, . . .} with respect to 〈 S,M, . . .〉 ,
i. e., the introduction of an operation of equating the results

Ξ


A
,

Ξ


B
that came from
S. The immediate putting

Ξ


A
=?

Ξ


B
should not be made, since these brace are simply
different sets. That is why, with isolated semigroups{ A
⊎ ;

Ξ′


A ,

Ξ′′


A , . . .
︸ ︷︷ ︸
GA
}
,
{ B
⊎ ;

Ξ′


B ,

Ξ′′


B , . . .
︸ ︷︷ ︸
GB
}
, . . .
at our disposal, we have to conceive of them as elements of a new set H of objects of a single
nature, i. e., 1) to carry out the mapping {GA ,GB , . . .} 7→ H, assigning new representatives
|ΞA 〉 ∈ H to the

Ξ

-brace, and 2) to equip H with an equivalence relation |ΞA 〉 ≈ |ΞB〉 (the
∗Foulis–Randall: “. . . we often prefer to regard a number of outcomes of distinct physical operations as
registering the same property, . . . representing the same measurement. . . . permitting an unrestricted iden-
tification of outcomes would lead to "grammatical chaos"” [52, p. 232].
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concept ‘the same’ above). Let us implement all of that by the scheme

Ξ


A
:=
[
µ1
λ1
]
α1
A
⊎
[
µ2
λ2
]
α2
A
⊎ · · · ֌
[
µ1
λ1
]
|α1


︸ ︸+
[
µ2
λ2
]
|α2


︸ ︸+ · · · =: |ΞA 〉 ∈ H,

Ξ


B
:=
[µ1
λ1
]
β1
B
⊎
[µ2
λ2
]
β2
B
⊎ · · · ֌
[µ1
λ1
]
|β1


︸ ︸+
[µ2
λ2
]
|β2


︸ ︸+ · · · =: |ΞB〉 ∈ H,
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(48)
In this, the new addition ︸ ︸+ must of course homomorphically inherit operations
A
⊎,
B
⊎, . . . , and
extension of this definition throughout H is then made with the aid of the very equivalence ≈:
|Ξ′A 〉 ︸ ︸+ |Ξ
′′
B〉 =
∣∣∣|Ξ′′B〉 ≈ |Ξ′′A 〉 ⇒ ∣∣∣ = |Ξ′A 〉 ︸ ︸+ |Ξ′′A 〉 = |Ξ′B〉 ︸ ︸+ |Ξ′′B〉.
Negation 6≈ of the relation ≈, e. g., |Ξ′A 〉 6≈ |Ξ
′′
A 〉, is exactly the very same distinguishability
that was discussed in sects. 2–3.
For the sake of convenience, we adopt the regular sign = for ≈, in order not to introduce yet
a further homomorphism, which are already numerous, with more underway. In other words,
the physics 〈 S,M, . . .〉 is ‘concentrated’ in the sign =, turning the empirical structures (48)
into the A -, B-implementations of the object |Ξ〉 ≡ |ΞA 〉 = |ΞB〉 that is being constructed.
The adequate term for it—DataSource—corresponds to the preliminary prototype of the
concept of a state, but we will adhere to the standard term, disregarding its variance.
6. Quantum superposition
Why the quantum?
J. Wheeler
. . . postulation of something as a Primary
Observable is itself a sort of theoretical
act and may turn out to be wrong
T. Maudlin [100, p. 142]
6.1. Representations of states. Let us simplify notation according to the rule
[
µ
λ
]
=: a.
The sought-for relationships between A , B, . . . then turn into the equalities
representations
of |Ξ〉-state
}
: a1 |α1


︸ ︸+ a2 |α2


︸ ︸+ · · · = b1 |β1


︸ ︸+ b2 |β2


︸ ︸+ · · · = · · · . (49)
They furnish representations |ΞA 〉, |ΞB〉, . . . of quantum state |Ξ〉 of system S. By design,
the DataSource object |Ξ〉 carries data

Ξ


A ,

Ξ


B and, more generally,

Ξ

-data (46) from
the arrays of any observations, including the imaginary ones. That is what eliminates the
initial need for the

Ξ


A -brace (24) to be came from the observation A , which is reflected in
the shortening of the term ‘representation of state’ to simply ‘state’ |Ξ〉. It should be added
that the straightforward storing of objects {|ΞA 〉, |ΞB〉, . . . } in a certain set H, but with the
independence of operations {︸ ︸+
(A ), ︸ ︸+
(B), . . . } preserved, would not differ from the tautological
substitution of symbols. Accordingly, the semantic autonomy of

Ξ

-brace would be inherited,
whereas invariance III requires the elimination of precisely this autonomy. What is more, the
set-theoretic original copy for operations {
A
⊎,
B
⊎, . . . } and ︸ ︸+ is one and the same—the union ∪.
The symbols |αs

 and |βs

 in (49) are no more than symbols. Hence the objects’ property
(49) of being identical must be reflected in terms of their coordinate a, b-components; pt. R(•).
This means that any aggregate (a1, a2, . . . ) is unambiguously calculated by means of a
certain transformation Û into any other (b1, b2, . . . ), when the two aggregates represent a
common |Ξ〉:
(a1, a2, . . .) = Û(b1, b2, . . .).
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The Û then becomes an isomorphism between these aggregates and, accordingly, their lengths
must coincide. This length—a certain single constant—will be symbolized as D.
6.2. Representations of devices. Spectra. Naturally, instrument is converted to the H-
structure language along with

Ξ

-objects. It is a set of symbols {|γ1

, |γ2

, . . . } in place
of the previous {γ1, γ2, . . . }. As has just been shown, their number for any C -instrument
should be equal to D. However, generally speaking, |TA | 6= |TB|, since TA and TB are assigned
in an arbitrary way (pt. O). Therefore if we take an illustration A {α1, α2} and B{β1, β2, β3},
then H-representation of instrument A should appear at least as {|α1

, |α2

, |α3

}. Clearly,
the already present distinguishability α1 6≈ α2 (sect. 2.2) is automatically converted into an
abstract distinguishability of new symbols |α1

 6= |α2

, and empirical A -distinguishability is
confined exclusively by these two symbols. In that case, for the purpose of noncontradiction,
the added third symbol |α3

, as an adjunction to the abstract relations |α3

 6= |α1

 and
|α3

 6= |α2

, should be complemented with the notion of its physical indiscernibility from
|α1

 or |α2

. By an extension of this argument one gets that every A -instrument should be
endowed with the (non)equivalence relation (≎/6≎) in terms of the H-structure by its formal
{|α1

, . . .}-representations. How to do this?
Let us proceed further from a self-suggested extension of pt. R. Let us declare—and it is
more than natural—that the numeric representations αs are linked not only to observations,
but to instruments as well. Each αs is the new object of a numeric type: a number or a
collection of numbers. Then, indiscernibility, say |α3

≏ |α1

, is recorded by coincidence of
the numeric labels α3 = α1 attached to the symbols |α3

 and |α1

 respectively. The abstract
(‘old’) distinguishability |α3

 6= |α1

, meanwhile, remains as it is. From these we have the
following formalization of relationship between ≏ and = by means of dropping/adding the
brackets |

:
|αs

 6≏ |αk

 ⇐⇒ αs 6= αk
|αs

≏ |αk

 ⇐⇒ αs = αk
}
under |αs

 6= |αk

. (50)
Call the quantity αs (numeric) spectral label/marker of eigen-element |αs

. Then, by H-
representation [A ] of instrument A we will mean the set of objects
{
|α1

, . . . , |αD


}
supple-
mented with the spectral structure (50):
[A ] :=
{
|α1


|α1
, |α2


|α2
, . . .
}
. (51)
It is not difficult to see that if |α1

 6≏ |α2

 then either |α3

 ≏ |α1

 or |α3

 ≏ |α2

. Oth-
erwise, spectral markers |α1 = |α2 should coincide, and primary primitives α1 6≈ α2 lose
their empirical distinguishability in contrast with (7). Multiple coincidence of |αs-markers is
acceptable.
In the presence of relations (50), it is natural to state that instrument A is coarser (more
symmetrical) than B, and, terminologically, to declare that the degeneration of the spectral-
label values takes place. In cases of embeddability like A2{α1, α2} ⊂ A3{α1, α2, α3}, instru-
ment A2 can even be called the same as (coinciding with) A3, but with a more rough scale.
Or conversely, A3 is a more precise extension of A2. In particular, the natural notion of a
device resolution fits here.
All instruments may then be mathematically imagined as having the same resolution, but,
perhaps, with degeneration of spectra. The non-coinciding instruments may be interpreted
as non-equivalent reference frames A 6= B in an observation space. According to pts. R(••)
and III, they are mandatorily present in the description. The spectral degenerations are also
present at all times, since element α1 can always be removed from TA , and there are no
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logical foundations to prohibit an observational instrument with family TA − {α1}. Hence
it follows that introducing the spectra—instrumental readings—is required even formally,
without physics. It is of course implied here that spectral (in)discernibility is realized in the
same manner as its statistical counterpart in sects. 2.6 and 4, i. e., by numbers. Incidentally,
such a property of αs—i. e., of being a numeric type object—is not necessary at the moment.
Spectrum {α1, α2, . . .} may be thought of as an abstract set of labels attached to the eigen-
elements. As numbers, it is introduced for the subsequent creation of models to classical/
macroscopic dynamic, and they are numeric.
Returning to D, we note that, in any case, the toolkit {A ,B, . . .} =: O in real use has
always been defined, fixed, and is finite. Consequently, the constant
D > 2 (52)
has also been defined and fixed, and it becomes the globally static observable characteristic;
an empirically external parameter. Meanwhile, the entire scheme internally contains the
natural method of its own extension D 7→ D + 1, and the potentially all-encompassing choice
D = ∞ may be considered the universally preferable one in quantum theory. By freezing
the different D < ∞, the theory makes it possible to create models, and they are not only
admissible but also well-known. Their efficiency is examined in experiments. Once again, the
D-constant, notion of spectra, and their degenerations are created by the (A ,B)-invariance
requirement, i. e., by pr. III.
As a result, the structure of H-representations of states and of instruments are liberated
from the arbitrariness in assigning the subsets TA in (8). The statistical unitary pre-images
(33) and H-elements of the form c|γs

can be associated with any ‘eigen symbol’ |γs

. They are
always available because all kinds of brace (31) are known to contain subfamilies when ingoing
Ψ,Φ-primitives get to a single one, e. g., to γ1. Therefore every representation a1 |α1


︸ ︸+ · · ·
is always equivalent to a

Ξ


C
-brace for some observation C with a homogeneous outgoing
ensemble {γ1 · · · γ1}. That is, one may always write
a1 |α1


︸ ︸+ a2 |α2


︸ ︸+ · · · = c1 |γ1


︸ ︸+ 0|γ2


︸ ︸+ · · · =: c1 |γ1

, (53)
while naturally referring to c1 |γ1

as one of the eigen-states of instrument C , with an appro-
priate correction of the similar definition in pt. O. The construction of the representation-
state space is far from being complete, since it is still a ‘bare’ semigroup H.
6.3. Superposition of states. Since writings (49) exist for any ensemble

Ξ

-brace, let us
consider the following two representations:
a1 |α1


︸ ︸+ a2 |α2

= b1 |β1


︸ ︸+ b2 |β2


︸ ︸+ · · · ,
a2 |α2

= b′1 |β1


︸ ︸+ b
′
2 |β2


︸ ︸+ · · · .
(54)
Comparison of these equalities tells us that the second one is a solution of the first one with
respect to a2 |α2

. Hence, the semigroup operation ︸ ︸+ admits a cancellation of element a1 |α1

.
This means that there exists an element a˜1 |α1

 such that{
a˜1 |α1


︸ ︸+ a1 |α1


}
︸ ︸+ a2 |α2

= a˜1 |α1


︸ ︸+
{
b1 |β1


︸ ︸+ b2 |β2


︸ ︸+ · · ·
}
⇓
0|α1


︸ ︸+ a2 |α2

= a˜1 |α1


︸ ︸+ b1 |β1


︸ ︸+ b2 |β2


︸ ︸+ · · ·
⇓ (due to (53))
a2 |α2

= b′1 |β1


︸ ︸+ b
′
2 |β2


︸ ︸+ · · ·
⇓ ⇓
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|0

 := 0|α1

= a˜1 |α1


︸ ︸+ a1 |α1

, a˜1 |α1


︸ ︸+ b1 |β1


︸ ︸+ · · · = b
′
1 |β1


︸ ︸+ · · · ,
where |0

 stands for a zero in semigroup H (image

0

 of the finite length brace

Ξ

) and 0 in
0|α1

 is a symbol of its [λ, µ]-coordinates. By canceling out as |αs

, one by one, if necessary,
one deduces that any element of H does have an inversion. That is, H is actually a group.
We re-denote inverse elements a˜s |αs

 by (−as)|αs

 and inversions of sums are formed from
their (︸ ︸+)-sums. Moreover, all the [λ, µ]-pairs turn into a set {a, b, . . .} equipped with the
above mentioned composition ⊕, which follows from an obvious property of unitary brace:
a|α1


︸ ︸+ b|α1

= (a ⊕ b)|α1

 (55)
(inheritance of clossedness under the ∪-operation). This composition is also a ⊕-operation of
a group and of a commutative one:
a ⊕ b = b ⊕ a, (a ⊕ b) ⊕ c = a ⊕ (b ⊕ c), a ⊕ 0 = a, a ⊕ (−a) = 0. (56)
Therefore the group nature of semigroup H and the group (56) come from the scheme{
single observations
A , B, . . .
}
⇒
{
semigroups
GA , GB, . . .
}
֌
֌
{
(A ,B)-invariance,
〈 S,M, . . .〉 and pr. III
}
⇒
{
group H
}
and, technically, from equatings/identifyings (49).
Thus handling the |Ξ〉-objects breaks free from its ties to the notion of observation, and
the objects admit the formal writings a|Ψ


︸ ︸+ b|Φ


︸ ︸+ · · ·. Call them superpositions. However,
as soon as they or the state are associated in meaning with the word ‘readings’ (it is discussed
at greater length in sects. 6.4, 6.5), this term should be replaced with a non-truncated one:
representation of the state with respect to a certain observation. In particular, the statistical
data νj are obtained from such expressions only after their conversion into a sum over eigen-
states of the form (49); a task of the subsequent mathematical tool. No superposition a|Ψ


︸ ︸+
b|Φ


︸ ︸+ · · · has any physical sense in and of itself [132, p. 137], [43] nor is it preferable to any
other one. It merely reflects the closedness of states with respect to operation ︸ ︸+, since any
|Ξ〉 is re-recorded as a sum of various {a|Ψ

, b|Φ

, . . . } in a countless number of ways and is
linked to any other such sum. Without a system of |αs

-symbols for instrument A , nothing
observable out of the aggregate of coefficients {±a, ±b, . . . } (and, of course, of the |Ψ

-
letters themselves) is extractable in any imaginable way. Accordingly, it is incorrect to speak
of—and that is a widespread misconception—the destruction of the superposition or of the
“relative-phase information” [125, p. 253], associating the word destruction with physical/
observational meanings or processes.
As a result, even without having a numeric theory yet and without resorting to the concept
of a physical quantity—superposition may not address whatever physical concepts, we arrive
at the paramount property, which characterizes the most general type of micro-observation’s
ensembles (17).
• Superposition principle.
A (︸ ︸+)-composition of quantum states a|Ψ

 and b|Φ

, which are admissible for
system S, is an admissible state
a|Ψ


︸ ︸+ b|Φ

= c|Ξ

, (57)
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and with that the set
{
a|Ψ

, b|Φ

, c|Ξ

, . . .
}
=: H forms a commutative group with
respect to operation ︸ ︸+. The family {a, b, . . .} of coordinate R2-representatives of
states (49) is also equipped with the same group structure under the ⊕-operation
(56) and with rule of carrying the operation ︸ ︸+ over to ⊕:
a|Ψ


︸ ︸+ b|Ψ

= (a ⊕ b)|Ψ

. (58)
Let us clarify the transferring (55) to (58). The union of the state prototypes a|Ψ

, b|Ψ

∈
H is known to belong to G. So the composition a|Ψ


︸ ︸+ b|Ψ

 should be identical to a certain
element c|Ψ

 ∈ H. It is clear that c depends on a, b and, hence, a|Ψ


︸ ︸+ b|Ψ

= c(a, b)|Ψ

.
The exhaustive properties of dependence c(a, b) are given by formulas (56) and (58) under
notation c(a, b) =: (a ⊕ b).
6.3.1. ‘Physics’ of superposition. Besides the essential non-physical nature of the (︸ ︸+)-addition—
“superpositions . . . we cannot recognize them” [43, p. 13], the primary and typical property
of quantum superposition is in the fact that, due to subtraction, it is possible the experimen-
tal obtainment of a ‘quantum zero’ in statistics from ‘non-zeroes’. With that, the ‘non-zeroes
seem’ to be positive, but there are ‘negative non-zeroes’—negative numbers (sect. 9.2). Sub-
traction manifests by the typical obscurations in interference pictures. S. Aaronson: “We’ve
got minus signs, and so we’ve got interference” [2, p. 220]. No classical composition
w̺1 + (1− w)̺2 (59)
of non-zero statistics ̺1, ̺2 can provide a zero value, since the zero will never be obtained via
the ∪-unions. The same is true for the pre-superposition in isolated brace

Ξ


A
, i. e., when
one instrument is in question.
Remark 12. One cannot but mention yet another counterexample to the superposition’s ‘physica-
lity’—‘the infamous quantum cat’. Any combination of the dead and living animal is meaningless as a
statement about new/nonclassical entity like a ‘(half-)dead/alive cat’ or about thinking of a ‘particle
as being both here and not here’; especially with an addition ‘at the same point in time’. It makes
absolutely no sense to add the absent nature’s phenomena to each other.
• What’s being added is states, not their names or verbal descriptions of envisioned
(‘fantasized’, “fantastic phantoms” [43, p. 15]) physical properties like ‘spin up/down’ or
‘dead/alive’. Cf. [100, pp. 134(!), 135].
The ‘cat-box open’ is a click, not state. Accordingly, the word combination ‘system is in a superpo-
sition’ is, at most, an interpretative allegory (sect. 10) without physical and mathematical content.
That is to say, strictly speaking, no quantum (micro)system ‘has ever been/dwelled in any state’,
much less in a superposition one, and much less at an instant. Meaning of the word ‘add’ is still
being created and implemented at objects to be thought of as ‘atomic irreducible’ entities—numbers
(sect. 7).
T. Maudlin notes on p. 133 of the work [100]: “Our job . . . is to invent mathematical representations
. . . , rather than merely linguistic terms such as “z-up.” . . . we are in some danger of confusing physical
items with mathematical items” (italics supplied). Here is an example of confusion. If we are going
to measure the x-spin in one of the z±-beams in a Stern–Gerlach device, then why and when does
this ‘observable’ determinacy—say, |→z〉—get turned into an x-uncertainty |↑〉 + |↓〉? (see also [12,
p. 232]). But what if we are going not to do this? Where does the system ‘intend’ to get into? The
x-uncertainty or z-determinacy? Which of the states it is in anyway? Examples to the ‘physicality of
states’ may be continued endlessly [16].
A statement about QM-superposition (without C-numbers) as a non-independent axiom
can be found in the book [72, p. 108] but arguments given there are circular: Hilbert space
֌ quantum logic of propositions ֌ superposition principle. Similarly, in the works [115]
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and [19, p. 164], all of that is ‘derived’ from modular lattices [22]. However, it is known
that the lattices come into QM from the Hilbert space structure and, on the other hand, the
purging QM-rudiments of such a space’ axiomatics constitutes Birkhoff’s 110-th problem [22,
p. 286]. Note also that, in connection with formal logic approaches to theory construction
[19, 52, 72, 84, 115, 150, 158], the issue of vindicating the matters that this logic deals with
[94, 92, 135] should not be neglected. A. Stairs: “If by “logic” we mean something like
“correct reasoning,” then it would make no sense to think of logic as “just another theory.”
[138, p. 258]. See also [51, p. 29].
6.3.2. Whence non-commutativity? Yet another fact that results from the above constructs
is that the availability of a superposition math-structure (57) reflects the presence of at least
two A , B with non-coinciding families of eigen-primitives {αs}, {βk}; a consequence of
pt. R(••). This point should be particularly emphasized, since in the future it will man-
ifest in the non-commutativity of operators ̂A and B̂. Even though this work does not
get to operators as a mathematical structure, it is clear that the emergent eigen-states
and spectra have a direct bearing on them. In this context, the ‘commuting instruments’
{|α1

, |α2

, . . .} = {|β1

, |β2

, . . .} can be treated, roughly speaking, as coinciding, because
this fact is independent of the specific spectrums {α1, α2, . . .}, {β1, β2, . . .} assigned to them.
If they differ, this is merely a different (numeric) graduation of the spectrum scale. It is the
same for all instruments, and its length is the parameter D.
Notice that definition of an A -observation is not different from the formal assignment of
the family TA (pt. O and (8)), which is why the non-coinciding sets TA , TB do always exist.
This provides a kind of abstractly deductive existence’s proof for the non-commutativity,
QM-interference—see further below sect. 6.5—and for the ‘utmost low-level finality’ of QM
altogether [92, 59, 7]. The whys and wherefores of theory do not require invoking the physical
conceptions. Of no small importance is that this point entails an independence of the classical
physics or its formal deformation, which are yet to be created from the quantum one (cf. a
selected thesis on page 15). In particular, no use is required of the notion of a certain pretty
small—again the classical/physical term—quantity, i. e., the Plank constant ~.
6.4. Physical properties. Now, the ‘general physics’ 〈 S,M, . . .〉 is mathematized into rep-
resentations (49) of states |Ξ〉 of system S. There is, however, an ambiguity, the source of
which is the fact that the natural/classical language also lays claims to a similar formula-
tion. This refers to the belief in the existence of mathematics (‘bad habit’ [104]; see also
[63], [94, p. 122], and [103]) that describes S as an individual object with properties regard-
less of observation; an observation that is not a functioning attribute of the mathematics
itself. In classical description, it is specified by definitions: point P of a phase space, (q, p)-
coordinatization of the point (manifold), and statistical distribution ̺(q, p).
On the other hand, quantum empiricism provides nothing more to us besides the ensemble
brace and |Ξ〉-states (pt. T). Preordained definienda with physical contents are unacceptable,
i. e., S should not be conceived as ‘something with physical properties’ or as an ‘individual
system’ [92, 93]. However, since the observational data (in the broadest sense of the word)
may not originate from anywhere but a certain |Ξ〉-object, there should subsequently create
1) the very concept of physical properties [152, pp. 211–230]
2) and their numeric values/characteristics.
This is habitually referred to as elements/images of reality [61, pp. 194], [4, sect. 10.2], [93,
§XIII.4.8]—Bell’s “beables” [18], or what we have been calling attributes of a physical system.
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M. Wartofsky: “The very notion of ’phenomenon’ or of ’the appearance of things,’ . . . is a
cognitive and perceptual act of abstraction” [152, p. 220]. The physical phenomena per se do
not exist [26].
Indeed, the primary ideology of sects. 1.3 and 2.1 tells us that an invasion of physically self-
apparent images into the theory should be avoided, because “quantum theory not only does
not use—it does not even dare to mention—the notion of a “real physical situation” (E. Jaynes
[61, p. 198]). Therefore everything, with no exceptions, should be (mathematically) created:
coordinates/momenta, energies, optical spectra, device readings, sizes, number/numeration
of particles (Fock space), their (in)discernibility/individuality (bosons/fermions), the notion
of a subsystem of system S (see (23)), etc.
Degrees of freedom and the numeric forms of what is known as the classical reference
frames—coordinates on manifolds—need also to be created. This fact is required for careful
posing the questions regarding the problem on quantum gravity, and it should be noted in
passing that the ‘simultaneity’ is the ill-defined term not only in the (general) relativity theory
but in QM as well (pr. I). The concept of a (non-elementary) particle∗, which is conceptually
close to the notion of a subsystem/part, is also a physical convention, and can only arise
from the |Ξ〉 or its models: Bose-condensates, quantum theories of various fields (relativistic
or non), deformation excitations in crystal lattices, quasi-particles in a superfluid phase, and
more. Clearly, the QFTs is a subclass of QM-theory, and not its extension. In particular, it is
common knowledge in QFT that no logical way to distinguish a particle from a certain state—
a vacuum excitation—exists. One word should therefore be used for both. In this regard,
the well-known dualism problem is eliminated because both the particles and waves are the
classical notions, and in quantum language, they turn into the derivatives of the notions of
state and mixture (23). Note that the ν-statistics also falls under observable quantities, and
constant D∗∗, if declared finite, is an example of an already created characteristic.
In other words, the logic of the above constructs prohibits not only the endowing the terms
‘internal state of an individual object S’ and ‘the system is in a (definite) state’ [92]–[94],
[108] with meaning, but also the indirect using their numerical forms. That would work in
circumvention of empiricism, assuming the a priori availability of mathematical structures
that do not rely on the state space. L. Ballentine remarks in this reagrd: “the habit of
considering an individual particle to have its own wave function is hard to break” [13, p. 238];
cf. “To speak of a single possible initial apparatus state is pure fantasy” (N. Graham [37,
pp. 241–242]).
6.5. Interference. Let us go on with comments as to the involving the physics-related argu-
mentation in the explication of quantal behavior. We have already mentioned above that for
this purpose there is simply no language of physics (see sects. 2.1, 6.4) and of mathematics
yet (see sects. 2.3, 5). That is why analogies of this sort are not only deceptive, but must be
prohibited for exactly the same reasons that accompanied boxes (5). The typical examples
in this connection are the notion of a simultaneous measurability and the 2-slit interference
[132, 3].
∗By a particle is meant here the classical kinematic conception. R. Haag: “What do we detect? The presence
of a particle? Or the occurrence of a microscopic event?”.
∗∗Dimension of a state space to come. A tensorial structure of this space—compound systems—pertains
directly to the physical properties but we do not touch upon this point here. As an aside, the same
structure will provide the means of distinguishing the aforementioned models under D = ∞.
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First and foremost, the two cases—whether one or two slits are open—are quite “different
experimental arrangements” [12, p. 236]
〈 S,M, . . .〉 ′ 6= 〈 S,M, . . .〉 ′′ .
There is nowhere to seek a means of their comparison or the transference of one into another
[12, p. 236]. Nonetheless, the classical approach, when opening another slit 〈 S,M, . . .〉 ′2 to-
gether with the first one 〈 S,M, . . .〉 ′1, in a literal sense, envisions characteristics for 〈 S,M, . . .〉
′′
(see sect. 6.4). In doing so, the transference method itself—‘addition of two physics’ 〈 S,M, . . .〉 ′
by the rule of arithmetic addition of statistics (59)—is meanwhile considered self-apparent.
Thus the natural questions, such as ‘why/where are the zeroes coming from, they shouldn’t be
there’. In accordance with the aforesaid, everything here is erroneous, including the ‘natural’
questions. There are no rules at the outset—(non)classical and even quantum, just as there is
no addition per se. A priori assuming them to stem from the obvious images for 〈 S,M, . . .〉 ′1
and 〈 S,M, . . .〉 ′2 is, in fact, the declaration of physical properties for 〈 S,M, . . .〉
′′ that, how-
ever, do not follow from anywhere [166, p. 55], [144], [3]. The (illegal) assumption of the
’negligible effect of the which-slit detectors’ mentioned on p. 27 is identical with a declaration
of a physical property or, similarly, a solenoid’s switch-on/off in the Aharonov–Bohm effect.
Taken alone, the ̺-distributions—separate for 〈 S,M, . . .〉 ′1 and 〈 S,M, . . .〉
′
2—are entirely
correct observational pictures, but introducing the rule (59) is indistinguishable from ‘in-
vention’ of physics∗; a logically prohibited operation. In other words, the mere fact of non-
adherence to this rule means that the grammatical conjunction of the verbs ‘to understand/
deduce’ with the noun ‘micro-phenomena’ is unacceptable even linguistically. It is the point T
that prohibits predefined (classical) semantics, and it was faithfully summarized by C. Fuchs:
“badly calibrated linguistics is the predominant reason for quantum foundations continuing
to exist as a field of research” [56, p. xxxix]. To understand or deduce (from mathematics)
quantal phenomena is unfeasible [132, p. 111] and is “absolutely impossible, to explain in any
classical way” (quote by Feynman). Just as with the elucidation of the nature of the quantum
state on p. 22, any (circum-)classical justification is guaranteed to fail here, since it is based
on significant and implicit assumptions.
The classical theory is a theory of observational objects with observational properties ex-
pressed by observational numbers. We possess none of the three items required to create
a quantum ( = correct) description (sect. 2). The very concept of the observation is a lin-
guistic notion of the classical vocabulary (sect. 2.2). Accordingly, the description can only
be changed into ‘to describe in newly created terms’. A. Leggett notes [86] that which is
understood as common-sense should also be replaced (see also [43, p. 10]). The reason is
clear. The common-sense operates—and that’s perfectly normal—in observational categories
rather than in structureless ‘microscopy’ (9) and ∪-abstractions of sect. 5.1; cf. Bohr’s corre-
spondence principle [71].
For similar reasons, we cannot think (or envision) that a particle in an interferometer
‘flies through the slit’, ‘has (not) arrived’, “is located somewhere in the region of space” [38,
p. 7] ‘now/later’, that ‘the choice of a detector has been delayed’ (Wheeler [61]), or that
a “photon . . . interferes . . . with itself” [38, p. 9], and that, generally, ‘something is flying
along a trajectory’, and ‘something’ is a particle at an intuitive understanding. Cf. Dirac’s
description of “the translational states of a photon” in §3 of [38].
∗D. Slavnov: “. . . to invent the physical exegesis of a . . . mathematical scheme” [164, p. 304]. W. de Muynck:
“Our custom of seeing classical mechanics as a no-nonsense description of ’reality as it is’ does not seem to
be justified. This custom is actually based on a confusion of categories . . . ” [108, p. 89].
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• “Photons are just clicks in photon detectors; nothing real is traveling from the
source to the detector” (ascribed to A. Zeilinger),
and this point is supported by all the known varieties of interferometers; we would add
that nothing really interferes inside them. For example, that the path of photons is not
represented by connected trajectories was impressively demonstrated with the nested Mach–
Zehnder experimental setup [34]. Asking “where the photons have been” [34] is also the
matter of a certain α-distinguishability. An interferometer—the entire installation—should
be perceived as nothing more than a black box 〈 S,M, . . .〉—the box (5)—‘outside of space and
time’. This is as a kind of irreducible element that produces the only entity—distinguishable
α-events, and no other; the box contains no ‘flying particles’. Say, none of the words in
the sentence ‘photon propagates a definite path’ are well-defined. Any assessment of the
screen flashes observed within interferometer—‘is zero statistics possible in any spot?’—lacks
meaning until the theory’s numeric apparatus is presented.
Remark 13. Thus Young’s interference of the light beams is inherently the quantum—not the
classical—effect: the result of the (photon) micro-events’ accumulation termed usually as the light
intensity. The classical electromagnetism, strictly speaking, does not explain but only describes the
phenomenon quantitatively with use of the numeric concepts of the positive and, which is important,
the negative values of observable quantities (E,H). Consequently, operations of their addition/
subtraction ‘explain, rephrase’ the effect in words “superposing, suppressing, waves, intensities”. (The
negativity with numbers is specifically commented on further in sect. 9.2.) In quantum approach, all
of these concepts are not yet available, and the phenomenon per se is no more than the observable
statistics of quantum clicks. The same—visible with the naked eye–macroscopic effect would take
place, if we had the ‘laser’ of, say, monochromatic slow electrons. To put it more precisely: the
emitter of something called the ‘material particles electrons, neutrons’, etc.
A criticism of the typical (a common event-space) analysis of the 2-slit experiment [48] is
already abundant in the literature. See, for example, the works [144](!), [166, pp. 55–58], [77,
Ch. 2], [49, 3], [113, p. 93].
Summing up, it is not the quantum interference that requires interpretative comprehension,
but its classic ‘roughening’. In other words, a scheme that latently presumes the rule (59)
of extrapolation of what is observed in macro and micro [152, (!) last sentence on p. 101].
It is this scheme—ascribing the ontological status [87, 86] to everything, not the quantum
approach, that contradicts the logic and experience; the habits “known as ‘ontology’ or
‘realism’” (W. Pauli). Moreover, the paramount component of constructs—{observation ֌
state′}—is cast out and replaced with (19) under such a transformation. The DataSource
object (p. 30) begins to be identified with the observational and numeric characteristics,
while the logic of the micro-world requires the distancing of precisely these two concepts,
with no need for the characteristics themselves.
Thus we should not be deriving the physics of one phenomenon from another and making
(super)generalizations, as soon as the incorrectness of the previous derivation method was
established.
• Quantum mathematics constitutes not a physical theory∗—and that is its distin-
guishing feature—but, rather, a single syntactic (meta)principle of forming the
mathematical models being subsequently turned into (the physical) theories. This
principle is not subject to any (physical) treatment.
∗S. Aaronson: “. . . it’s not a physical theory in the same sense as electromagnetism or general relativity . . .
quantum mechanics sits at a level between math and physics . . . is the operating system . . . ” [2, p. 110].
Fuchs–Peres: “quantum theory does not describe physical reality” [58, p. 70].
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To create the models, we already have a good deal of latitude: the toolkit O = {A ,B, . . .},
the parameter D, the families {TA , TB, . . . }, numbers {ws} of mixtures (23), and—thanks to
the notion of invariance III—spectra, a structure of a group, and the concept of (different)
representations of the one mathematical structure. This freedom will be subsequently aug-
mented with the key notions of a mean and of time t, and also composite systems, the classical
Lagrangians, their symmetries, and phenomenological constants. This is what is currently
termed as a quantization procedure of the classical models—quantum phenomenology. All
that remains is to examine the numeric constituent of quantum mathematics.
7. Numbers
By number we understand not so much
a multitude of unities, as the abstracted
ratio of any quantity to another quantity
of the same kind, which we take for unity
I. Newton (1707)
. . . where do units come from?
S. Gryb & F. Mercati [62, p. 91]
7.1. Replications of ensembles. In connection with the emergence of a group, the numeric
representation of brace also undergoes change, since the ‘doubling’ of the semigroup into a
group∗ through adjoining the inversions deprives coordinate a of its distinction in comparison
with the inversion −a. Given the involution
− (−a) = a, (60)
it makes no difference what to call an element, and what to call its inversion in the pair
{a,−a}.
The aforesaid is best demonstrated by another way of ‘digitalizing’ the empiricism, which
is realized as the infinite replication of finite ensembles{
{Ψ}n{Ψ}n · · ·
}
=
{
{Ψ}n
}
∞
=: {Ψ}n∞ . (61)
That is, empirically, any infinite ensemble is thought of as created by repetitions (copies) of
the finite objects {Ψ}n. It is in this (the only) meaning, i. e., Σ ×∞, that one can read the
writing Σ → ∞ for the infinity postulate (14), because at the moment we possess neither
the mathematics nor the mathematical/topological concepts like a passage to the limit lim
Σ→∞
.
The copies, in turn, are replications of the atomic primitive {Ψ}1. Replication is thus an
operation of the same significance as ∪ and ⊎. With it, the

Ξ

-brace is characterized by the
‘numeric’ combination {
[n1∞,m1∞], [n2∞,m2∞], . . .
}
⇄

Ξ


(indices label the αs-primitives), which has been created from the unitary brace by the scheme
(33) =

{
{Ψ}∞′{Φ}∞′′
}
9
9
K
9
9
K
9
9
K
9
9
K
{α · · · · · ·α}∞
 ֌

{
{Ψ}n∞{Φ}m∞
}
9
9
K
9
9
K
9
9
K
9
9
K
{α · · · · · ·α}(n+m)∞
 ֌ [n∞,m∞]α. (62)
The semigroup union

Ξ′

⊎

Ξ′′

 is then conformed with the writing
∗Formally known as a symmetrization of the commutative associative law (monoid) [23]. Curiously, under
commutativity and associativity [30, sect. 1.10], solution to the problem of embedding is unique [23, pp. 15–
17], and otherwise no solution, in general, exists. There exist the classes (Mal’cev (1936)), which are not
axiomatized by finitely many ∀-formulas [99, pp. 216–217].
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[n′1∞,m
′
1∞], [n
′
2∞,m
′
2∞], . . .
}
⊎
{
[n′′1∞,m
′′
1∞], [n
′′
2∞,m
′′
2∞], . . .
}
=
=
{
[(n′1 + n
′′
1)∞, (m
′
1 +m
′′
1)∞], [(n
′
2 + n
′′
2)∞, (m
′
2 +m
′′
2)∞], . . .
}
. (63)
Moreover, the n-, m-quantities may be freely thought of as real ones due to the R2-continual
infinity of ensembles proven above (sect. 4). The empirical rationale of this is apparent;
namely, fractions of arbitrarily large ensembles {ΨΨ · · ·}.
This way of matching an infinity with the Σ-postulate automatically inherits the translation
of associativity/commutativity, because the ‘percentages’ like s and w, just as the rules
(43)–(44) themselves, do not even emerge. There, these numbers were originating from Σ-
postulate, and it, in turn, was demolishing the pair (κ,S) itself in (42): S→∞. It is clear
that, according to (63), the semigroup structure G is also inherited, turning into the addition
of the numeric pairs
(n′,m′) ⊕ (n′′,m′′) = (n′ + n′′,m′ +m′′). (64)
Returning to the group, we observe that the ‘negative symbols’ (−n,−m) might be initially
taken as the semigroup G being duplicated, with equal success and with the same arithmetical
addition ⊕, while positive (n,m) could be considered as their inversions. Summing up, let us
specify the rules of passing to the numeric representations
(33) ⇐=⇒ {±
Ψ
p,±
Φ
q}α, (p, q) ∈ R2 , (65)
and, to avoid ambiguity, let us replace the binary composition symbol ⊎ with a new symbol
a
+
for objects (65):
{
Ψ
p,
Φ
q}α
a
+ {
Ψ
n,
Φ
m}α.
The previously dropped primitives Ψ, Φ have been restored here, since they will be further
needed for theory’s invariance (sects. 7.4, 7.5), although they are still unnecessary at the
moment.
It is not accidental that we spoke of ‘numerical labeling’ the brace (p. 21), since the question
of arithmetic on them has not yet arisen. Although ν-statistics—the real R-numbers—are
already involved, their use was based on the accustomed perception of a number. In accor-
dance with pr. II, the number formalization of ensemble empiricism should be considered in
greater detail.
7.2. Number as an operator. Let us begin with the classical simplification
A =
{
{Ψ}, {ΨΨ}, {ΨΨΨ}, {ΨΨΨΨ}, . . .
}
, (66)
and the notion of the number does not yet appear in any form; it should be created (II).
The mathematical abstracting the observation micro-acts is an employment of the oper-
ation ∪ and of its closedness (see sect. 5.1); for example, {Ψ} ∪ {ΨΨΨ} = {ΨΨΨΨ}. All
the symbols in (66), as well as the character ∪, is of course merely a convention, and they
may be changed. By writing (66) in symbols like + and {a, b, c, d, . . .}, this set should be
supplemented with identities as a+ b = c, b+ b = d, . . . , i. e., with a binary construction +.
Then (semi)group and commutative superpositions arise. Though note that the introduction
of numbers at this point—even if only as symbols—is not necessary. It would reduce to re-
notation of the set’s elements, to be precise. But the empirical description requires their uni-
fication, as manifested in the numeric notation like {Ψ} =: 1{Ψ}, {ΨΨ} =: 2{Ψ}, . . . . It is
precisely this pattern that was implicitly kept in mind in procedures (33)–(34) and (61)–(62),
i. e., when introducing the numbers n by means of replication of finite or infinite ensembles:
{Ψ · · ·Ψ}n ⇐⇒ n{Ψ},
{
{Ψ}∞ · · · {Ψ}∞
}
n
⇐⇒ n{Ψ}.
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The symbol⇐⇒ should read here as ‘the same thing as’. Clearly, the very idea of conjunction
of the two entities—empirical brace (33) and the notion of a number (sects. 5.1, 5.2)—is not
otherwise implementable. That is to say,
• we have no any means of translating the macro-observations into the numerical
language, other than through the notion of ‘quantity of something’:
9
9
K
9
9
K A -transitions
9
9
K
9
9
K
⇓ ⇓
{‘quantity of’} {‘something’} (replication)
⇓ ⇓
{numbers} {Ψ-primitives, ensembles}
ց ւ
n{Ψ}
. (67)
Otherwise, the quantitative theory would have nowhere to originate even at the level of the
natural N-number characters.
On the other hand, the numerical tokens are ‘affixed’ not only to the ‘atom’ {Ψ}, but also
to other objects, any ones at that. Therein lies the primary meaning of this, still supra-
mathematical concept; one might even say, a definition according to which this notion has
been conceived and is being used universally. Here are examples:
3{Ψ} ≡ {ΨΨΨ}, 2{ΘΦ} ≡ {ΘΘΦΦ}, {ΦΨ}
2
֌ {ΦΨΦΨ}, a
3
֌ 3a, c
1
֌ 1c. (68)
Accordingly, there emerge identities like 2b ≡ 4a, 3a ≡ c, 1c ≡ c. In other words, as we
complete simplification (66), while abstracting the empirical contents of numeric symbols,
they should be defined as unary operations {1̂, 2̂, 3̂/4, π̂, . . . } that operate at the A-set (66)
as automorphisms.
Now, replication is formalized as an operator n̂ with its numeric symbol n:
ψ
n̂
֌ nψ, ψ, nψ ∈ A, n ∈ R, (69)
where ψ is understood to be any (sub)ensemble/(sub)set∗. We will refer to this fact as
implementation of a replication operator by numbers.
7.3. QM and arithmetic. We immediately observe the following properties.
The operators are applicable to each other, i. e., being a family {n̂, m̂, p̂, . . .}, they are
closed with respect to their composition n̂(m̂ψ) = (n̂ ◦ m̂)ψ = p̂ψ, and among them, there is
an identical operator 1̂ψ = ψ. The empirical meaning of the concept a fractional portion of
the infinite ensemble (see (61)) tells us that for each n̂ there exists its inversion n̂−1. Hence,
the composition of replications n̂ ◦ n̂−1 must return the former ‘quantity’: (n̂ ◦ n̂−1)ψ = 1̂ψ.
As the family {n̂, m̂, p̂, . . .} provides automorphisms of the A-set, these operators entail the
associative identities ((n̂ ◦ m̂) ◦ p̂)ψ = (n̂ ◦ (m̂ ◦ p̂))ψ [83, §I.1.2]. The common nature of the
replication and of the ∪-union also signifies that there are relations in place that mix the
actions of the unary n̂’s and the binary union of ensembles. At a minimum, one suffices to
define the action of replicator on a ‘∪-sum’ of replications. Clearly, the case in point is a
distributive coordination of ◦ and ∪:
p̂(n̂ψ ∪ m̂ψ) = (p̂ ◦ n̂)ψ ∪ (p̂ ◦ m̂)ψ.
∗Formally, in the language of the ZF-theory, nψ would be organized as an ordered pair (n, ψ) := {{n}, {n, ψ}}
[82], where n is a cardinality of a set consisting of copies of the object/set ψ.
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We now observe that the indication of ψ everywhere in ensemble identities loses both
necessity and significance, and the ψ-label becomes a semblance of a dummy index or the unit
symbol [kg ], which can be changed. As we omit it, the theory is freed of ψ as of a ‘calculation
unit’. Then the last relation, as an example, acquires the form of a property between the
operator n-symbols (69), if {∪, ◦} are replaced with the symbols of binary operations {+,×}:
p × (n+m) = (p × n) + (p ×m). (70)
Supplementing this relation with other empirically determining properties, one infers that the
unary operationality of n̂-replications (69) is indistinguishable from the binary operationality
on their n-symbols. The latter, in turn, acquires the multiplicative structure of a commutative
group
n ×m = m × n, (n ×m) × p = n × (m × p), n × 1 = n, n × n−1 = 1, (71)
and, as for the addition +, it is already binary and commutative due to properties of ∪
(sect. 5.1):
n+m = m+ n, (n+m) + p = n+ (m+ p), n+ 0 = n. (72)
After acquiring properties (70)–(72)—call them arithmetic, symbols {n,m, . . .} turn into
abstract numbers, although their operator genesis does not go away and is yet to be involved.
This is where a full list of requirements for the concept of a real number should be added,
and which have to do with ordering <, completeness/continuality, and their relations with
algebraic rules (70)–(72). We will take that this is done axiomatically [159, pp. 35–38],
although the algebraic constituent of this ‘axiomatics’, as we have seen, is not axiomatical
but deducible from empiricism. Multiplication ×, and also the subsequent (⊙)-multiplication
of C-numbers (80), is a most nontrivial part in deriving the structure ‘the arithmetic’.
As an outcome, we reveal an essential asymmetry in genesis of the standard binary struc-
tures + and ×, and thereby a greater primacy of QM-consideration even over the (seemingly
natural) arithmetic. Indeed, binarity may come only from operation ∪, which is primordially
unique and, thereby, is inherited only to the one natural prototype—addition.
• Multiplication is not featured in the superposition principle, nor does it arise di-
rectly as a binary structure. The absence of a multiplication symbol in (57)–(58)
is not an accident.
The multiplication originates in the closedness of replications n̂ ◦ m̂, and they are required
according to the M-paradigm (12). In effect, any non-operatorial way of introducing the n-
numbers is not a self-evidence for empiricism. However, the pure axiomatic declaration of
arithmetic (70)–(72) will, in one way or another, require a (reciprocal to (67)) treatment
of a number in the context of ‘the quantity of what?’, while its empirical pre-image always
appears in the pair ‘the quantity + of something’. Another way to put it is that,
• in the foundations of theory, the predecessor/analog of the notion of a physical
unit arises,
though the ultimate description is a description in terms of binary structures (70)–(72). It is
carried out by dropping/attaching the symbols like ψ, which is a quantum generalization of
the physical theory’s independence of measurement units. Certainly, when formalized, the n̂-
replication and its binary n-twin become universally abstract. For example, the n̂-operator
may be applied to the quantum case in which the object ψ has already an internal structure
associated with the presence of Ψ,Φ-primitives; this changes no the essence of the matter.
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Another example is when numbers n give birth to the really observable quantities. See also
sect. 5.3, Remark 16, and additional discussion in sect. 9.
Let us now proceed from the fact that the comprehension/relation of the number∗ and its
operator has been formalized as described above, and ‘axioms’ (70)–(72) have been comple-
mented with the negative numbers
n+ (−n) = 0,
for they have been fully justified in the superposition principle.
7.4. 2-dimensional numbers. A number in and of itself, as a replication operator, may be
applied to any ensemble or, in fact, to anything at all. However, in quantum case, the ‘upper’
primitives are attached to every ‘lower’ α-event. These primitives, as was noted above, have
to be got rid of. At the same time, the minimal structure, associated with the homogeneous
array {αs · · ·αs} as a whole, is a unitary brace {
Ψ
n,
Φ
m}αs containing two ‘upper’ primitives Ψ,
Φ. Their order, however, is arbitrary there. That is to say, given (n,m)α there are two quite
equal objects {
Ψ
n,
Φ
m}α and {
Φ
n,
Ψ
m}α that are subjected to a replication. Each of them should
be in a relationship (see sect. 5.1) to any other brace (62), which is already apparent in the
example of ‘1-dimensional’ versions (n, 0)α and (n′, 0)α. There always exists the number m
such that n′ = m × n.
As in the classical case (68), the sought-for generalizations of replicators are the transitive
automorphisms on unitary α-brace, they are not abstract and not arbitrary. They are strictly
bound to the declared meaning of a number: N̂ -operation of creating the copies. Therefore,
by virtue of the equal rights of Ψ and Φ, it is imperative to bring the two 1-fold copying acts
N̂{
Ψ
n,
Φ
m}α and M̂{
Φ
n,
Ψ
m}α into play, which differ in the permutation of primitives Ψ ⇄ Φ.
This point will determine a quantum extension of the replication.
As a result, since we have nothing but the ‘copying’ N̂ and ‘union’
a
+, the most gen-
eral transformation of the brace {
Ψ
n,
Φ
m}α into (any) brace {
Ψ
n′,
Φ
m′}, which is in a quantum-
replication relation with it, is determined by the rule
{
Ψ
n,
Φ
m}α
(N̂,M)
֌ {
Ψ
n′,
Φ
m′}α, {
Ψ
n′,
Φ
m′}α = N̂{
Ψ
n,
Φ
m}α
a
+ M̂{
Φ
n,
Ψ
m}α. (73)
This is the quantum version of operators (68)–(69), and the foregoing ideology of N̂ -operators
and of liberation from the Ψ-symbols remains in force and entails the following. The numeric
implementation of replicating the unitary brace (65), along with the (n,m)-representation of
itself, is also determined by a certain pair (N,M) ∈ R2, i. e., by an operator symbol (N̂,M ).
The aforesaid means that the numeric form (n,m)
(N̂,M)
֌ (n′,m′) of transformation (73) is
indistinguishable from a composition of pairs
(N,M) ⊙ (n,m) = (n′,m′),
where ⊙ is a designation for the new binary operation. Its resultant structure is derived from
the arithmetic nature (71) of the 1-dimensional replication (68) described above, i. e., from
the rules
N̂{
Ψ
n,
Φ
m}α = {N
Ψ
×n, N
Φ
×m}α, M̂{
Φ
n,
Ψ
m}α = {M
Φ
×n, M
Ψ
×m}α. (74)
∗As concerns the philosophical literature, the issue of numbers was, likely, discussed, and it would be ap-
propriate to quote: “. . . numbers: they can be added to one another, perhaps multiplied by one another,
. . . . But it is typically obscure what sort of physical relation these mathematical operations could possi-
bly represent” (T. Maudlin [100, p. 138]; first emphasis ours, second in original). Cf. Einstein’s remarks
concerning “concepts and propositions” and “the series of integers” on p. 287 in [42].
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Here, a positivity/negativity of symbols (n,m) in (65) should also be taken into account.
Having regard to the foregoing, rules (73)–(74) generate the Ansatz
(N,M) ⊙ (n,m) = (±Nn±Mm, ±Nm±Mn), (75)
wherein all the four signs ± are independent of each other, and the (×)-multiplication of 1-
dimensional numbers in (71) and (74) have been re-denoted by the habitual standard Nm :=
N ×m.
As was the case previously, just emerged binarity for ⊙ should inherit associativity, exis-
tence of unity 1, and of inversions. Namely, if the (n,m)-pairs are identified with the notation
(56) according to the convention
(n,m) =: a, (76)
then the following properties should be declared:
(a ⊙ b) ⊙ c = a ⊙ (b ⊙ c), a ⊙ 1 = a, a ⊙ a−1 = 1. (77)
From (73)–(74) it is not difficult to see that the combining (77) with (56) leads to a distributive
coordination of operations ⊕ and ⊙:
c ⊙ (a ⊕ b) = (c ⊙ a) ⊕ (c ⊙ b). (78)
However, the direct examination of this property shows that Ansatz (75) satisfies it automat-
ically, and examination of an associativity in (77) particularizes (75) into the expression
(N,M) ⊙ (n,m) = ±(Nn±Mm,Nm+Mn);
now, with two independent signs ±. Moreover, in passing we reveal the commutativity
a ⊙ b = b ⊙ a, (79)
though it was not presumed prior to that. The search for unity 1 and subsequent finding an
inversion of the element (n,m) yield:
1 = (±1, 0), (n,m)−1 =
( n
∆
,−
m
∆
)
, ∆ := n2 ±m2 .
Both the (±)-symbols continue to be independent here. The choice ∆ = n2 − m2 leads to
the absence of inversions (n, n)−1. This is in conflict with the group property (77) and also
gives rise to the unmotivated exclusivity of the unitary brace {
Ψ
n,
Φ
n}α. The case ∆ = n2 +m2
remains, and it reduces the scheme to the form
1 = ±(1, 0), (N,M) ⊙ (n,m) = ±(Nn−Mm,Nm +Mn)
with a single symbol ±. It is not difficult to see that the choice of sign + or − leads to
models that are isomorphic in regard to which of representatives (+1, 0) or (−1, 0) should be
assigned for the identical replication Î. By virtue of (60) it does not matter, and we declare
1 := (1, 0), (N,M) ⊙ (n,m) = (Nn−Mm,Nm+Mn) . (80)
This is nothing more nor less than the canonical multiplication of complex numbers n+i ·m =
a ∈ C, if the following identifications are performed:
(1, 0)⇄ 1, (0, 1)⇄ i, {⊕,⊙}⇄ {+, ·}, (n,m)⇄ (n+ i ·m). (81)
In view of the paramount importance of the C-number field in QM [20], let us provide
additional substantiations to the rigidity of emergence of this specific numeric structure, i. e.,
the axiom collection (56), (77)–(80). Among other things, the transpositions Ψ ⇄ Φ used
above fit more general reasoning.
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7.5. Involutions and C˜∗-algebra. Apart from a freedom in ordering the primitives Ψ⇄ Φ
in brace {
Ψ
n,
Φ
m}α, there is one more arbitrariness: reappointing them (Ψ ֌ Θ, . . . ) as
elements of the set T. However, no physics predetermines any of these degrees of freedom.
Say, if other ingoing T-elements Θ, Ω were present in (31) instead of Ψ, Φ, then the G-
semigroup theory, strictly speaking, should be declared the segregated theories GΨΦ, GΘΩ, etc.
It is clear that the marking the theories, or they as a family, is a manifest absurdity, and they
should be thus factorized with respect to all kinds of ways to label them by T-primitives. The
liberation from the Ψ,Φ-icons and reconciliation of the result with pt. R+ (p. 25) are then
performed by the scheme {primitive has changed ֌ a number character is changing}.
Inasmuch as declaring the {Ψ,Φ,Θ, . . .} to be ingoing primitives in (31) is a replacement
of one to another, any such an appointment boils down to permutations of no more than
pairs, with two types (inner/outer):
̂גΨΦ : (Ψ,Φ)
Ψ↔Φ
⇄ (Φ,Ψ), ℵ̂ΦΘ : (Ψ,Φ)
Φ↔Θ
⇄ (Ψ,Θ). (82)
However, it is immediately obvious that these reappointments change nothing in the ∪-
relationships between (31) and are defined by the structure relations ̂גΨΦ
2 = Î, ℵ̂ΦΘ
2 = Î. Then
the need to indicate the primitives themselves, as required, is eliminated, and their symbols
may be thrown away, if semigroup G is correctly furnished with the two abstract involutions
̂ג and ℵ̂. The G itself, of course, possesses also involution (60) that turns it into the group H,
but this involution has already had a numeric representation (65) by signs ±. To be precise,
it suffices to identify here the term ‘numeric’ with the group arithmetic of the ⊕-addition (56)
coming from the superposition principle realized on pairs (64)–(65). Therefore the operators’
actions (82) should be carried over onto objects defined in precisely this manner; nothing
more needs to be assumed.
Operator ̂גΨΦ is immediately translated into a numeric form independently of the property
that the objects {
Ψ
n,
Φ
m}α form a (semi)group. In fact, since the swap Ψ⇄ Φ in the unordered
pair
̂גΨΦ : {
Ψ
n,
Φ
m}֌ {
Φ
n,
Ψ
m} = {
Ψ
m,
Φ
n} · · ·
(the α-label is dropped here as superfluous) is indistinguishable from permutation of numbers
n⇄ m, the symbols Ψ and Φ may be thrown away, organizing the numbers themselves into
the ordered pairs
· · · ⇒ (n,m)
̂ג
֌ (m, n).
When required, the α-symbol returns hereinafter.
Let us now proceed to the outer involution Φ⇄ Θ in (82):
ℵ̂ΦΘ : {
Ψ
n,
Φ
m}֌ {
Ψ
n,
Θ
m}.
It is indifferent to the (first) Ψ-element of the pair, and, extracting it by the rule
{
Ψ
n,
Φ
m} = {
Ψ
n,
Φ
0}
a
+ {
Ψ
0,
Φ
m},
the question boils down to finding a representation to the transformations(
{
Ψ
n,
Φ
0}
a
+ {
Ψ
0,
Φ
m}
)
֌
(
{
Ψ
n′,
Φ
0}
a
+ {
Ψ
0,
Θ
m′}
)
(
?
n′,
?
m′).
The component {
Ψ
n,
Φ
0} must go into itself, since the symbol Ψ attached to it has not changed.
It means that n′ = n, and one is left with the task
{
Ψ
0,
Φ
m}
?
⇄ {
Ψ
0,
Θ
m′}.
46 YU. BREZHNEV
However, operation ℵ̂ΦΘ recognizes only the primitive’s symbols rather than their numbers.
That is, replications m̂{
Ψ
0,±
Φ
1} = {
Ψ
0,±
Φ
m} do formally commute with ℵ̂ΦΘ. Hence, omitting
the letters {Ψ,Φ,Θ}, it will suffice to look for the representation of ℵ̂ by numeric pairs
(0,±m) factorized with respect to replications m̂, i. e., by the set {(0, 1), (0,−1)}. It, for its
part, remains to be transformed into itself, and the replication operators n̂, m̂ will recreate
the generic case. The identical transformation (0,±1)֌ (0,±1) is ruled out due to ℵ̂ΦΘ 6= Î;
therefore, (0,±1)
ℵ̂
֌ (0,∓1). Restoring all the symbols that were dropped, effect of ℵ̂ reduces
to the sign change for the 2-nd element of the coordinate pair:
(n,m)
ℵ̂
֌ (n,−m). (83)
There is no need to change sign for the 1-st element, as this change is the operator −Î ◦
ℵ̂. Furthermore, one observes that the already existing group inversion −Î coincides with
composition
(ℵ̂ ◦ ̂ג)2 = −Î, (84)
and we may even ‘forget’ about it, leaving the equipment
{⊕, Î, m̂, ℵ̂, ̂ג} (85)
of semigroup G as an irreducible set of mathematical structures over it.
In this connection yet another—more formal—motivation of the passage {semigroup ֌
group}, and thus of the superposition principle, does arise. In fact, the derivation of ℵ̂
above engaged the inversion (60), but reappointment of primitives Φ ⇄ Θ in (82) is a fully
independent act. Therefore if we forget about ‘(−)-copies of the positive pairs’ (0,m), then
the involutory nature of automorphism ℵ̂ΦΘ would still reproduce the semigroup G in numbers
by ‘duplication’ m֌ ±m, i. e., create the negative pairs (0,−m), thus turning G into a group
H. An analogous reasoning on the symbol ‘−’ could be cited even earlier, when the C-field
was being derived.
Now, remembering the above-described passage to the binarity of ⊙-multiplication on the
(n,m)-pairs, we arrive at the problem of matching it with structures (85). Clearly, one needs
only to ascertain the functionality of operators ̂ג and ℵ̂ that were not available yet. Relation
(84) immediately gives us the correspondence ℵ̂ ◦ ̂ג ⇄ i, since i2 = −1. Hence, one of these
operators, say ̂ג, manifests itself in the imaginary unit i. Origin of this operator—permutation
̂גΨΦ in (82)—is the very same permutation Ψ⇄ Φ that generated the i-object in algebra (80)–
(81). The second operator, i. e., (83), as is directly seen, is also not related to the binary ⊕
and ⊙ but determines the change i ֌ −i. This means that the QM-consideration does not
just lead to the field C but to a division C˜∗-algebra, which is equipped with the two non-
binary operations
a
ℵ̂
֌ a∗ , a
̂ג
֌ a˜.
Informally, it defines all the basic actions on ‘complex quantities’ and thereby determines a
QM-extension/generalization of the intuitive (arithmetical) manipulations with the habitual
real quantities (67)–(72). Consequently, the four binary arithmetical operations—addition/
subtraction and multiplication/division—should be supplemented with the two unary ones:
conjugation ℵ̂ and swap ̂ג.
Remark 14. A curious observation for the formal complex-number ‘mathematics’ is in place. None
of these operations boils down to involution −Î. We mean that each of the pairs ( ̂ℵ,−Î) or (̂ג,−Î) is
expressible through (̂ג, ̂ℵ), and not the reverse. To put it plainly, the self-suggested going from the
natural sign change (i. e., −1̂ over R) to the inversion of the ⊕-addition (i. e., −Î over C) deprives
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the involution −Î of its primary character, as it has taken in the domain R. Furthermore, the 2-nd
operation ̂ג is, in a way, more ‘primitive’ even than the complex conjugation ̂ℵ, as the operation has
to do with a formal pair (n,m)—merely transposes it—and does not invoke the arithmetic action, as
does ̂ℵ when changing the sign m 7→ −m in (83). Relationship between the operations is by the binary
multiplication: a˜ = i ⊙ a∗.
We note—and this is important [24]—that the observational statistics are unchanged upon
both operations ̂ג, ℵ̂.
7.6. Naturalness of C-numbers. Thus the T-set primitives have been entirely banished
from the theory, with the exception of the eigen-state αs-markers, which are needed only
for distinguishability (sect. 2.1) of A -observations. These markers may be interchanged, but
permutability αs ⇄ αn is already reflected by the superposition’s commutativity. Taking
now into account the fact that reassigning the α-labels does not touch on the concept of the
number, one infers: the invariance attained above is exhaustive. As a result, we draw the
following conclusion.
• The coordinate representatives {a, b, c, . . .} of states and of their superpositions (57)
form the complex number field C˜∗ equipped with the structures of conjugation and
of swap:
(n+ im) ∗7→ (n− im), (n+ im) ˜7→ (m+ in). (86)
Statistical weights νs in object (34) are invariant with respect to both the involu-
tions νj(a
∗) = νj(a) = νj(a˜) for each component as independently.
What is more, the commentary on the primacy of QM over the abstract arithmetic (see p. 42)
has a logical continuation.
• Quantum-theoretic description invokes no C-numbers; it creates them together
with the C˜∗-algebra.
This fact is remarkable in its own right because the ‘2-dimensional’ numbers arise at the low-
est empirical level, not from the need for solving any mathematical problems. Mathematics
is still lacking. Therefore pt. R+ (p. 25) could have even been weakened by replacing ‘homo-
morphism onto numbers’, roughly speaking, with the ‘homomorphism onto continuum’. Our
minimal points of departure are replications and the ‘ingoing/outgoing’ structure of brace
(31). The imaginary part of the complex number—as a supplement to the real one—comes
in essence from the left hand side of the conception Ψ 99K α. Neither does theory depend
on the meanings that will be later attached to the physical concepts—observables, measure-
ment, spectra, means, etc—to their interpretations or rigorous definitions. At the same time,
the interferential ‘effects of subtraction and of zeroes’ are intrinsically present in the very
foundation of the construct.
Let us add, in conclusion, two more formal vindications of rigidity of emerging the C-
structure. In doing so, one assumes that we have already had the R-numbers.
Unitary brace contain pairs of the form {
Ψ
n,
Φ
0}. The binary operations {⊕,⊙} on their
numeric representatives (n, 0) are closed and, as easily seen, form a commutative field, which
is isomorphic to R. It is a subset of the generic pair set (n,m). From the operator nature of ⊙
it follows that these pairs form a certain distributive ring with general-group properties (77)–
(78). The presence of the field R contained in it tells us that these pairs can be realized by the
elements n+mx of, at most, associative algebra A over R. Here, n,m ∈ R, x is a generator of
any ring’s element beyond R, and the habitual + replaces the sign ⊕. Multiplication of two
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such elements
(n+mx) ⊙ (n′ +m′x) = nn′ + (mn′ + nm′)x+mm′x2 = · · ·
immediately shows that result does not depend on order of factors, i. e.,
· · · = (n′ +m′x) ⊙ (n+mx),
due to permutability of {n,m, n′,m′} between each other and of any x with itself. This is a
direct consequence of 2-dimensionality of the algebra A; it must be commutative. Invoking
now the well-known Frobenius theorem on associative and commutative structures containing
the field R [151], we arrive once again at a multiplication of the form (80).
7.6.1. Topologies on numbers. Yet another reasoning about exclusivity of C-numbers follows
from matching the topological and algebraic properties of the general numeric systems [116,
sect. 27]. The case in hand is the uniqueness and non-arbitrariness in emergence of the
topological field C; Pontryagin (1932). In our case, we have two continuums—numeric sym-
bols n and m, each of which, by the very method of constructing the

Ξ

-objects (33), is
equipped only with the natural ordering <. Since we have no any more math-structures yet,
the topology, continuity, and limits on each of the continuums can already be introduced
with respect to this relation. For one example, there is no need to introduce a topology
by a priori creating the arithmetic operation of multiplication/divisibility of rationals (and
a concept of the prime integer), as it is done in the p-adic approaches to QM [165, 162, 77].
The ‘non-naturalness’ of multiplication as compared with addition was already noted above.
Besides, in the p-adic versions for a numeric domain, the topologically and physically required
matching between the natural ordering, connection, and continuity [116, Ch. 4] is destroyed,
and the approaches themselves stipulate the existence of the observations numbers with a
comprehensive arithmetic. At the same time, questions about ‘structure’ of the x-space at
Planck’s scale∗ and about measurements by rationals (see motivation in [162, 165]) are not
arising yet, because we are not relying on physical conceptions and are not yet introducing
these notions as numerical. From the low-level empiricism standpoint, any objects, apart
from the R2-continuality and frequencies ν, require call for independent axioms. In turn, the
primary nature of the R-continuality itself follows directly from the boolean 2T (p. 19) and
Σ-postulate of infinity.
8. State space
Quantum states . . . cannot be ‘found out’
[121, p. 428]
“what is really going on”
B.-G. Englert [43, p. 12]
8.1. Linear vector space. Once replication (N̂,M ) of brace {
Ψ
n,
Φ
m}α has acquired a binary
character
(N̂,M)
(
{
Ψ
n,
Φ
m}α
)
⇐⇒
(
(N,M) ⊙ (n,m)
)
|α

= a|α

, (87)
the difference between ‘what is replicated’ and ‘how many times’ disappears. A symbol |α


of the eigen-state has been attached to the abstract C-number a. Construing this point as a
∗D. Mermin: “when I hear that spacetime becomes a foam at the Planck scale, I don’t reach for my gun” [104].
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quantum analog of re-choosing (liberation of) the measurement units (p. 42), we obtain that
the two formal states a|α

 and b|α

 are always connected by a certain number operator p̂:
b|α

= p̂
(
a|α


)
, p̂⇄ b ⊙ a−1 .
Manipulating the numbers becomes independent of symbols |α

. The way to formalize this
is to think of generic states a|Ψ

∈ H as the ‘solid characters’
a|Ψ

֌ |Ξ〉 ∈ H, (88)
i. e., as the |Ξ〉-elements of a new set H, which is equipped with the p̂-replication images
represented by the p-family (p ∈ C) of maps
C×H
·
7→ H : p · |Ξ〉 = |Φ〉 ∈ H, (89)
and which is obliged to inherit the structure (87). This inheritance says that coordination of
⊙-multiplication in (87) with the replication’s p-realization is performed by a new operation ·
of the unary kind on H, i. e., (89), which should be subordinated to the rule
p ·
(
a · |Ψ〉
)
= (p ⊙ a) · |Ψ〉 (p, a ∈ C, |Ψ〉 ∈ H). (90)
Due to this connection between operations ⊙ and ·, it would be logical to refer to the latter as
multiplication as well. An analogous rule had already occurred in relationship (58) between
the ⊕-number C-structure and the (︸ ︸+)-group superposition, i. e., when the multiplicative
structures {⊙, ·} were not available yet.
Among replication operators p̂, there exists an identical transformation
p̂ = Î : a|Ψ


Î
֌ a|Ψ

,
to which a symbol of the numeric unity p = 1 corresponds. Hence, in accordance with
(88)–(89), there follows the rule
1 · |Ξ〉 = |Ξ〉, ∀|Ξ〉 ∈ H.
It is clear that the (·)-multiplication needs to be agreed with the ⊎-union. Let us make
use of the fact that the object of (quantum) replication may be not only the unitary brace
{
Ψ
n,
Φ
m}α, which is equivalent to the eigen-element a|α

, but a (
a
+)-sum of the like objects and,
in general, any constituents of quantum ensembles (see p. 41). Therefore the p̂-replication
p̂
(
a|α


︸ ︸+ b|β


)
= · · · (91)
is known to have its twin-sum
· · · = a′ |α


︸ ︸+ b
′ |β

= · · · (92)
with certain coefficients a′, b′. Let us, for the moment, give back (91) to the initial language
of operators/brace according to the scheme
(N̂,M
︸ ︷︷ ︸
p
), {
Ψ
n′,
Φ
m′
︸ ︷︷ ︸
a
}α
a
+ {
Ψ
n′′,
Φ
m′′
︸ ︷︷ ︸
b
}β. (93)
Take also into account a pre-image of operation
a
+ on objects (91), i. e., ︸ ︸+. Then, (93) and
content of sects. 7.4–7.5 shows certainly that expression (92) must be of the form
· · · = (p ⊙ a)|α


︸ ︸+ (p ⊙ b)|β

= · · · .
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Reconverting, by (90), expressions like (p ⊙ a)|α

 into the operatorial p̂(a|α

), we complete
the ellipsis
· · · = p̂
(
a|α


)
︸ ︸+ p̂
(
b|β


)
.
Passing now to the p-number and to the |Ξ〉-objects (88), i. e., replacing a|α

֌ |Ψ〉, b|β

֌
|Φ〉, one derives a linearity of operation · when acting on a sum:
p ·
(
|Ψ〉 +ˆ |Φ〉
)
= p · |Ψ〉 +ˆ p · |Φ〉.
Here, the H-addition ︸ ︸+ has been carried over to the group H as a new symbol +ˆ. This is
nothing but a distributive coordination of the (·)-multiplication with the group addition +ˆ.
In a similar way—through a number operator, one establishes yet another relation a ·
|Ξ〉 +ˆ b · |Ξ〉 = (a ⊕ b) · |Ξ〉 between · and +ˆ; its origin is equivalent to (58). From the
constructs above, it is not difficult to see that we have examined all the possibilities of
replicating the superpositions (57) or their constituents by arbitrary C-numbers, which is
why we have exhausted all the compatibility rules that stem from the two fundamental
operations—replication and union (︸ ︸+).
Thus, having considered the passage (88)–(89) as a final homomorphism of the H-group
elements a|Ψ

 onto the objects |Ξ〉 ∈ H, i. e., adjusting the previous concept of a state—
DataSource (p. 30), we infer the following.
• The minimal and mathematically invariant bearer of the observation’s empiricism
is an abstract space H of states |Ψ〉 of the system S. The structure properties
H :=
{
|Ψ〉, |Φ〉, . . .
}
(commutative group under operation +ˆ), (94)
C := {a, b, . . .} (field of complex numbers: (56), (76)–(80)),
a · |Ψ〉 ∈ H (closedness under external operation ·), (95)
a ·
(
b · |Ψ〉
)
= (a ⊙ b) · |Ψ〉, a · |Ψ〉 +ˆ b · |Ψ〉 = (a ⊕ b) · |Ψ〉,
1 · |Ψ〉 = |Ψ〉, a ·
(
|Ψ〉 +ˆ |Φ〉
)
= a · |Ψ〉 +ˆ a · |Φ〉
(96)
of the space coincide with axioms of a linear vector space (LVS) over the field C.
This ‘axiom list’ should be complemented with a declaration of the global number D value
(52) established above. Stated in a nutshell, the nature of the quantum state space is twofold:
group superposition (57) and operator nature of the ‘a-numbering’ its elements. Relations
(96) describe rules of their ‘interactions’. It is known that such formations, while being
implemented by a binary algebra of numbers, turn into the vector spaces and modules [83,
Ch. 5], [151, sect. I(7.1–2), II(13.4)]. Concerning consistency of these rules—say, of numeric
distributivity (78)—with relations (96), see the work [119].
Remark 15. A certain oddity is in place. QM-empiricism is such that the standard definition of
LVS by the all-too-familiar axioms (94)–(96) is more nonphysical by its nature than the ‘generalistic’
abstraction of a group with operator automorphisms [83]. Anyway, a point like this might be expected
because, as noted in sect. 1.2, meaning of all of tokens in (1) and their origin are entirely unknown,
and linearity of QM is radically different from other ‘linearities’ in physics.
8.2. Bases, countability, and infinities. From a ban on transitions αs 99K αn under
s 6= n it follows that unitary αs-brace (33) correspond to vectors as · |αs〉 that are linearly
inexpressible through each other. Aside from the general ensemble brace (31), no other ele-
ments exist, and all of them are in one-to-one correspondence with the vector representations
a1 · |α1〉 +ˆ a2 · |α2〉 +ˆ · · ·. Each such vector has a statistical pre-image (31), and vice versa;
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there are no gaps. This means that the system of vectors {|α1〉, |α2〉, . . .} forms a basis of
H—basis of LVS, and the number of symbols |αs〉 is its dimension: dimH = D. The D = ∞
case, just like anything associated with infinity, can not be formalized without topology, and
its presence is presumed, but discussion is dropped. We just remark that even earlier, when
arising the 2-dimensional continuum, we have silently assumed the R × R-product topology
on it. This assumption is natural, inasmuch as it does not involve additional constructions/
requirements. Thus if properties (94)–(96) are directly accepted to be empirical, then the
mathematical rigors augment them axiomatically on the outside; one constructs the mathe-
matical theory.
The micro-transition
A
99 in sect. 2.1—the click—is a solitary entity. This means that the
number of the eigen αs-primitives for an actual instrument may be either finite or discretely
unbounded. We base upon the fact that continual formations is a product of mathematics
rather than empiricism; see also [94, p. 35]. The T-set, as an example, is also non-continual,
but that premise may even be given up, because only a discrete portion of this set is present
at arguments (transitions
A
99K). Notice incidentally that continuum does not feature in the
ZF-axioms [82] but is also created, just as “an infinity is actually not given to us at all, but is
. . . extrapolated through an intellectual process.” (Hilbert–Bernays [79, p. 55]). One obtains
a countability of the set of vectors {|αs〉}. Hence follows a completeness of H and countability
of dimension (52), as of numeric LVS-invariant:
D = 2, 3, . . . ,ℵ0 (= dimH). (97)
8.3. The theorem. The states |Ψ〉 and their sums, at the moment, form a formal family
of different elements. Recall that symbols {≈, 6≈} in pt. R, as from the end of sect. 5.4, have
been replaced with the standard ones {=, 6=}. The physical aspects of 〈 S,M, . . .〉 were being
left aside so far, and, for example, |Ψ〉 and c · |Ψ〉 were the different vectors of the H-space.
However,
• empiricism (deals with and) yields not states and their superpositions but |α〉-
representations.
It is these representations that carry information about statistics (ν1, ν2, . . .) through coef-
ficients aj . The replicative character of c-multipliers and Σ-postulate entail however that
the two vectors 1 · |Ψ〉 and c · |Ψ〉 should correspond to the one and the same statistics
νD = (1, 0, . . .) = ν˜D under an observation D with the eigen collection {1|Ψ

, . . .}. Let us
write the equalities
νD և 1 · |Ψ〉
︸ ︷︷ ︸
= a1 · |α1〉 +ˆ a2 · |α2〉 +ˆ · · ·
︸ ︷︷ ︸
։ νA ,
observation D observation A
ν˜D և
︷ ︸︸ ︷
c · |Ψ〉 =
︷ ︸︸ ︷
c ·
(
a1 · |α1〉 +ˆ a2 · |α2〉 +ˆ · · ·
)
։ ν˜A
(98)
and look at them in the following order: the first line—from right to left, and the second—
in the reverse direction. Their right hand sides are the carriers of some statistics νA and
ν˜A . The frequencies νA = (ν1, ν2, . . .) come from the numeric set (a1, a2, . . .) under the same
environments 〈 S,M, . . .〉 that give rise to the statistics νD. But it is also generated by
the representative c · |Ψ〉, which is associated with the same 〈 S,M, . . .〉 ; hence, ν˜D = νD.
By virtue of the second equal sign in (98), the same 〈 S,M, . . .〉 are associated with the
second A -collection (c ⊙ a1, c ⊙ a2, . . .). Therefore the frequencies ν˜A that emanate from it
have to be identical to those emanating from the first collection (a1, a2, . . .). That is to say
ν˜A = νA , and the scale dilatations |Ψ〉֌ c · |Ψ〉 are not recognized by any A -instruments.
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A more concise reasoning is that the quantum replication c = n + im may be viewed as the
1-dimensional replications n̂(a|α

), ı̂ (a|α

) of all the brace as|αs

-images and of sums like
n̂(a|α

) ︸ ︸+ (̂ı ◦ m̂)(a|α

). These replications do not change the superposition statistics as a
whole.
The aforesaid gives birth to a universal—stronger than ≈ and irrespective of instruments—
observational equivalence relation
|Ψ〉 ∼∼ const · |Ψ〉
on the space H, i. e., the ‘physical’ indistinguishability (sect. 2.4).
The basis vectors |αs〉 and their (∼∼)-equivalents will be referred to as eigen vectors/states
of instrument A ; clearly, the concepts of instrument and of (macro)-observation (O) should
now be distinguished. Accordingly, the spectral construction (50)–(51) should be corrected.
Call the data set {
|α1〉|α1 , |α2〉|α2 , . . .
}
=: [A ] (99)
[A ]-representative of instrument A in H. The add-on (99) does not touch on H-space, since
the spectral labels |αj are the self-contained objects independently of vectors |αk〉. These
labels and their degenerations determine ‘internal properties’ of the formalized notion of an
instrument (99). Conversely, any state vector |Ψ〉 or c · |Ψ〉 may be treated as one element
of the [C ]-representative for imagined/actual instrument C (spectrum is arbitrary) and is
a (+ˆ)-sum of the eigen elements for any other [A ]-representative. Remembering (23), we
arrive at the final conclusion that determines the (pre-dynamical) theory of macroscopic data
on micro-events.
• The core (1-st) theorem of quantum empiricism.
(1) The mathematical representatives of physical observations and of preparations
are the quantum states |Ψ〉 and statistical mixtures of eigen |α〉-states{
|α1〉
(̺1), |α2〉
(̺2), . . .
}
, ̺1 + ̺2 + · · · = 1. (100)
(2) Properties (94)–(97) define objects |Ψ〉 as elements of a (complete separable)
linear vector space H over the algebra of complex numbers C˜∗.
(3) Dimension dimH = D > 2, representing an observable quantity (D 6= ∞), is
set to the value max{|TA |, |TB|, . . .} = D as required by an accuracy of the
toolkit O = {A , B, . . . }. The eigen |α〉-vectors for each [A ]-representative
provide a basis of H independently of spectra (99).
(4) Rules (94)–(97), for a fixed D 6= ∞, are categorical as an axiomatic system;
they admit no non-isomorphic models. States |Ψ〉 and c · |Ψ〉 are statistically
indistinguishable, and statistics νj(a) are invariant to involutions (86).
The words ‘complete separable’ have been supplemented here for mathematical reasons. This
point is partly commented in [24]. Indeed, the algebra constructed above needs some amend-
ments of a topological nature because all the construction contains three infinities: continuum
C, continuum H, and dimension D. In this connection, see the work [116].
To summarize: having considered the micro-destruction arrays with empirical rather than
a formal take on arithmetic, ideology of creating the quantitative theory leads to the key
feature of quantum states—their addition, and the ‘quantities under addition are measured’
by complex numbers.
Remark 16. Again, as in sect. 7.3, we draw attention to a hidden and (logically) unremovable
extension of the physical units’ concept.
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• “. . . units. Despite the rudimentary nature of units, they are probably the most inconsis-
tently understood concept in all of physics . . . where do units come from?” [62, p. 91].
Surprisingly, the na¨ıve and straightforward conjunction of this concept with an abstract number seems
to contravene the multiplication arithmetic; but not the addition one. The typical example illustrates
the point:
(2kg) × (3kg) 6= 6kg.
On the other hand, 2 × (3kg) = 6kg and (2kg) + (3kg) = 5kg, and the ‘kg’ may be replaced here
with any other entity: the classical metres, the abstract ‘Quanten Stu¨cke ψ’, etc. They have no any
operational meaning, but one cannot get by without them.
The digital characters acquire their usual abstract-numerical meaning—mathematization [94]—
only when we throw the ‘units’ {Stu¨ck, ◦C, sheep, ψ, . . . } out of data like {5Stu¨ck, 5◦C, 5sheep, 5ψ,
. . . }. The symbol ‘5’ in 5◦C is the very same ‘5’ as in 5 · |α〉. It is pointless without such a matching/
abstracting. At the same time, an inversion of this abstracting—attaching {Stu¨ck, ◦C, sheep, ψ, . . . }
to the character 5—is always an interpretation of abstraction: interpretation ‘the Stu¨ck ’, ‘◦C-inter-
pretation the Celsius’, etc. It is not improbably that this is the only point when completed quantum
theory—QM/QFT/quantum-gravity yet to be constructed—resorts to the word ‘interpretation’. See
also comments by D. Darling concerning “sheep, numbers, add, things”, etc on p. 178 in the book
[56].
Incidentally, within this (physical and quantum) context,
• the very LVS should be regarded as no less a primary math-structure than the
numbers themselves. Empiricism gives rise to both these structures simultaneously.
The habitual physics’ construct {number × physical unit} exemplifies in effect a simplest (1-
dimensional) LVS. However, the structure ‘LVS’, in contrast to the ‘bare’ arithmetic, simply
‘does not forget’ an operator nature (unary multiplication ·) of the structure ‘number’ and
its empirical inseparability from the notion of the unit. A direct corollary of this point is
the fact that if we were to give up or disregard the pr. II, then this would be tantamount to
impossibility to introduce the further empirical (and classical) notion of a physical unit.
As we have seen, nothing above and beyond what was used in constructing the mathematics
(94)–(97) is required to explain the meaning of the quantum state. Besides, we have obtained
not merely a completion of construction (11):
⊕(a1, |α1〉; a2, |α2〉) = a1 · |α1〉 +ˆ a2 · |α2〉 +ˆ · · · .
In the first place, one establishes the genesis of the quantal discontinuity: distinguishabil-
ity of the micro α-events is a discrete entity in the very nature of the perception process∗
(sect. 2.2, Remark 2). Accordingly, “indivisibility, or “individuality”, characterizing the ele-
mentary processes” (N. Bohr [122, p. 203]) must be formalized into the ‘elemental’ click. We
also clarify the formalization of measurement/preparation and of genesis of the C-numbers.
The well-known (∗)-conjugation operation also finds its origin. Moreover, it is supplemented
with a transposition ℜ(a) ⇄ ℑ(a) of the real/imaginary part of the C-number, and this
transposition should be regarded just as natural operation as the conjugation. The emer-
gent concepts of spectra, of their degenerations and eigen-states provide near comprehensive
mathematical image of physical observables. The state becomes devoid its mysteriousness
∗This also bears on preparation 〈 S ,M, . . .〉 . Say, smooth reducing the interferometer intensity is not an
empiricism but an imagination of the abstracta like infinity and continuity. Clearly, such an (incorrect)
substitution of the perception process should somewhere be replaced with a ‘correct comprehension’—
introduction of a discrete event’s category. The continuality in the perception of (the classical) reality is an
act of theorization, whereas the nature of perception is fundamentally discrete.
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[87, 111], since it is explicitly built in terms of the unique model of the ‘statistical’ |α〉-
representatives supplemented with macroscopic mixtures (100).
9. Numbers, minus, and equality, revisited
. . . quas decet numeris negativis
exprimantur, additio et subtractio
consueto more peracta nullis
premitur difficultatibus∗
L. Euler (1735)
9.1. Separation of the number matters. The empirical adequacy of quantum theory can
be based only on phenomenological ensembles (sects. 2.5, 4). Creation of their mathematics
tells us, then, that the ‘quantity of something’ (67)–(69) turns into a formal operational
algebra through labeling the operator replications (sects. 7.1–7.2) and yields the numbers
proper. At first, they emerge merely as
︷ ︷
n-symbols of abstractions (67)–(68) with ordering <
︸ ︸
↓ ↓
. . . . . . . . . . . .
and then as internal objects of theory:
. . . . . . . . . . . .
↓ ↓
︷ ︷
numbers n as elements of arithmetic (70)–(72)
︸ ︸
↓ ↓
︷ ︷
(m, n)-numbers a and their C˜∗-algebra (56), (76)–(80), (86)
︸ ︸
.
↓ ↓
. . . . . . . . . . . .
These steps are necessary and mean that not only are the complex numbers far from self-
evident, but even the negative ones are; a key place (49), (54) wherein a group arises. All
the other structural points, first and foremost the observational quantities, may be further
produced (even as conceptions) only through certain mathematical mappings:
. . . . . . . . . . . .
↓ ↓
︷ ︷
observations numbers νs and αs:
as 7→ (statistics νs), |αs〉 7→ (spectra αs)
tensor structure of the H-space
︸ ︸
. (101)
In other words, if a concept is a numeric one already in empiricism—frequencies, spectra,
etc—then its meaningful formalization by means of a mathematical definitio can resort only
to a mathematics that we have at our disposal: LVS and algebra of numbers.
∗ . . . if we represent the notions, which are necessary, by negative numbers, then addition and subtraction
. . . are executed without any difficulty.
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Thus numerical quantities in the entire theory are initially divided up by their emergence
mechanism (II): the intrinsic abstracta and reifications (101). Without such a division, the
circular logic is inevitable, and the above-mentioned ‘unit’ treatment of numbers would still
be supplemented with the task of their observational interpretation, complicated by 2-di-
mensionality. This task would be present in formalism not merely as a problem, but as an
inherently intractable challenge. Actually, any entity can be identified with numbers, and
this is why, the quantum empiricism and principium II—paradigm of the very number in a
physical theory—insist on the need to pay the closest possible attention to all these things.
Remark 17. In this regard, the situation has a parallel with the known history of electrodynamics
of moving bodies; as was pointed out just before wording the principium III. Lorentz’s contraction
theory is inconsistent, if the space-time tags to events are not linked up to the precise empirical
definitions in different reference frames: clocks/simultaneity and rigid rods. In quantum case, the
chief subject of empirical definition is a concept of the number. Otherwise, the meaning of the very
notion of a quantitative theory has been blurring.
We have seen now that there is no way of founding the theory only on the observable
categories (see Remark 2). The attempts to use statistics at the very beginning of the theory
are known [107, 66, 10, 13, 44, 90, 92], and rightly so; they were initiated by H. Margenau
(1936) [7, Ch. 15]. However, the scheme just given is rigid. In order to obviate the premature
appearance of the very need for an interpretation, the scheme must not be varied. Being a
sequence of steps, it provides in essence an answer to the principium II.
9.2. Operations on numbers. The last step in this scheme contains, in particular, the map
a 7→ ν, i. e., measurement (47). Its form should be established in its own right—Born’s rule
[24]. To illustrate, the na¨ıve transformation of negative numbers p into the actually perceived
quantities by a ‘seemingly natural’ rule like |±p| is not correct and does not follow from
anywhere. For the built algebra (94)–(96), the operation ±p 7→ |±p| is extrinsic and illegal,
it is just not there. According to ideology of sect. 1.3, not only objects—numbers, vectors,
quantities, characteristics, etc—but also all the math operations should be created because
one without the other is meaningless. The more so as the numeric object of the theory—
the complex pair (±p,±q)—is as yet single, it contains a principally ‘non-materializable’
ingredient (sect. 7.4) and behaves as a whole. As regards empiricism, the negative and the C-
numbers are equally ‘nonexistent, fictitious entities’, since the state’s mathematics (94)–(96)
has not been supplemented with the doctrine of ‘empirically perceived’ quantities (101). In
fact, the step-by-step transformation of the binary operation ∪ to symbols ⊎, ︸ ︸+,
a
+ and,
finally, to operations {+ˆ, ·,⊕,⊗} does not terminate at states. Algebra (94)–(96) will be
further required to create now the mathematically correct calculation rules of the proper
observational quantities.
The foregoing is amplified by the fact that pr. II has been involved in the classical descrip-
tion and in vindication/refutation of, say, the hidden variable theories. Here, numbers are
identified with the reified quantities, and subtraction is taken for granted from the outset.
However, the negative quantities are also being created here, and they are constructed in the
same manner as with the ‘quantum zero’ for the H-group in sect. 6.3.
Indeed, the readings and physical quantities are no more than notches (not numbers),
and ‘negative notches’ are introduced prior to mathematics of symbols according to the fol-
lowing (subconsciously) intended scheme. The self-apparent physical conventionality, which
have been calling ‘an addition’ of two such notches, must produce, in accordance with the
supra-mathematical requirements of physics, what is named ‘nought, zero’. Two waves at
a point, for instance, compensate each other. The result is asserted to be identical with a
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zero the mathematical; and that is the subtraction. Stated differently, the minus is a fairly
abstract construction in its own right. In this respect one might state that the very classical
physics needs an interpretation—in terms of strictly positive ‘the number of Stu¨cke’. Math-
ematization of empiricism into numbers is not a distinctive feature of quantum description.
However, comprehension of ‘abstracting the minus sign’ is not confined even to this. A word
of explanation is necessary with regard to the situation.
Mathematics formalizes [82] the positive/negative ±p into the pairs’ classes (m,n) being
equivalent with respect to an ‘adding’ of the class (ℓ, ℓ) (the ‘zero’):
(+m) := (m, 0) ≈ (m+ ℓ, 0 + ℓ), (−n) := (0, n) ≈ (0 + ℓ, n+ ℓ),
±p ⇐⇒ (m− n) := (m,n) ≈ (m+ ℓ, n+ ℓ), (102)
where m,n, ℓ are to be seen as ‘something strictly positive’. This ‘adding’ is yet another
tacitly assumed and much more abstract action: addition of objects of some other kind—
‘positive couples’ (n,m). Technically, at an appropriate place of sect. 7, we would have to
introduce such classes and to assign their own algebraic operations for them. The result might
be called the ‘genuine’ arithmetic (of ‘the positives’) and could be enlarged to the ‘complete
arithmetic’ with multiplication and division.
Hence, the single-token object (+m) or (−n), which we perceive as self-evident (cf. pr. II),
is a rather unobvious construction—the generic class of two-token (m,n)-abstractions (102).
Essence of the symbol of a negative number (−n) is revealed only when contrasting the two
positive ones. Exactly the same situation has occurred when deriving the superposition prin-
ciple in (48)–(49) and (54). It is clear that once all the ±p-numbers, and the ‘normal’ positive
+p’s among, have been formalized into the equivalences (102), the fact that they possess any
‘natural meanings’—like ‘operation of the quantity p 7→ |p|’ invented above—becomes more
than unnatural. The abstract class operations that appear out of nowhere. Similarly with
Q-numbers and their R-extension: classes of equivalent pairs (n/m) := (n,m) ≈ (nℓ,mℓ).
9.3. Naturalness of abstracta. We thus infer that rejection or disregard of the similar
‘naturally abstract’ set-theoretic models would be tantamount to rejection of the minus sign
even in the elementary physics. This is an absurd, but its root is a need for abstracting. On
the other hand, the motivated deduction of these models cannot be replaced with (hidden)
axiomatic assumptions. Such an ambivalence is, in our view, one reason why the problem with
‘decrypting’ quantum postulates is so difficult, because it touches upon the metamathematical
(and metaphysical) aspects of the very thinking [79, 31, 81]. The stream of subconsciously
abstractive homomorphisms∗ is considerable and is always larger than it seems. In sects. 3–9,
we have described not all of them. ‘Difficulties’ with complex numbers, strictly speaking,
should already be attributed to the level of the usual negative ones. Bearing in mind that
the ‘minus’ comes from the equals sign = [102] and the equality comes from the scheme
(48) ֌ (49), both the principia—II and III—are very important (and functioning) also in
the classical case. In quantum case, they are just fundamentally unavoidable for the very
creation of the theory. The nature of QM theory, of arithmetic, of complex numbers, and of
their algebras is one and the same.
Transferring the reasoning above to the natural numbers N, the degrees of classical and
quantum abstraction become even indistinguishable. Empirical motivation leads, in one way
∗For a philosophical discussion to these representations and the origin of models, see [152, pp. 1–230]. As
one more comment concerning the abstracting/realism we refer to the first half of a letter from A. Einstein
to H. Samuel in [120, pp. 157–160]; see also [42].
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or another, to the standard von Neumann’s representation for ordinals
0 := ∅, 1 := {∅}, 2 := {∅, {∅}}, 3 := {∅, {∅}, {∅, {∅}}}, . . . , (103)
i. e., to using the ZF-axiom of union: n + 1 := n ∪ {n} [82]. Therefore less obvious is the N-
numbers themselves, to be followed by the ordering <, topologies, extensions, generalizations,
etc. The formal characterization of all the experimental reduces then to the successive cre-
ating from the set-theoretic atoms—unions of sets—their direct products and mappings into
other constructions of the same kind. Hence, both the physical images ‘being under a ban
above’ and auxiliary structures—dimensionalities, orders, etc—should equally well become
homomorphisms onto certain formal constructions regardless of the description’s classicality/
quantumness. Presence of, say, non-binary operation C∗-conjugation does not stand out,
because its nature does not differ from the one of (habitual) subtraction and of division.
All of these are involutory structures that have been mathematically inherited from the em-
pirical meta-requirements: repetitions (M-paradigm), physics 〈 S,M, . . .〉 , and invariance III
(sect. 5.4).
To close the section we add that the distancing the concepts of state/DataSource and of
a physical property is the continuation of a more primary idea—detaching the macro-ob-
servations themselves from what is being represented theoretically [152, 90, 92]. This issue,
as B. Mazur has noted in [102, p. 2], “has been with us . . . forever: the general question
of abstraction, as separating what we want from what we are presented”, i. e., the sepa-
rating the ‘bare’ empiricism from mathematics with Σ-limit and the number. The atomic
constituent of observation is a physical event [92, 65, 149], and it begins and terminates,
in effect, in (6≈A )-distinguishability of α-clicks (sect. 2.1). Any the continual is a ‘specula-
tive theory’ (act of abstracting), not the underlying empiricism. Therefore all the further
matters—numbers, arithmetic, space-time, cause/effect, (non)inertial reference frames, the
notions of an observer/event/coordinates in the relativity theory (i. e., a quantum view of
the equivalence principle), device ‘readings off’, composite systems, etc—no matter how self-
evident—are the math add-on’s, which could originate only in the ‘∪-theory’ of sect. 5. Fol-
lowing von Weizsa¨cker, it might be called the ‘Ur-theory’. There are no contradictions in
observations themselves, whether we call them macro- or micro-scopic. Contradictions do
arise in the ‘mathe¯maticae being constructed’.
10. About interpretations
It is therefore not . . . a question of a
re-interpretation . . . quantum mechanics
would have to be objectively false,
in order that another description . . .
than the statistical one be possible
J. von Neumann [110, p. 325]
. . . suspect that all the deep
questions about the meaning of
measurement are really empty
S. Weinberg
E. Tammaro: “At this point in time it appears that a stalemate has been reached with
regard to the interpretation of quantum mechanics” [146, the very 1-st sentence].
10.1. States and measurement. The source of the numerous treatments of QM [69, Ch. 10],
[84, Ch. 10], [7, 123, 127, 121, 129]—and ‘the Copenhagen’ among—is the fact that the
α-event and subconscious comprehension of Ψ (pt. S) are a priori endowed with physical
properties, with observational characteristics of the DataSource, and with operationality
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of the canonical QM-concept |Ψ〉∗. However, none of these initially exist. There are only
abstractions Ψ
A
99K α of the primitive α-events. An important point is that even the ‘eigen α-
click’ (of a photon/electron say, in the epr-experiment) should not be identified with an |α〉-
state. The latter is re-developable with respect to eigen-states associated with other click-sets
of any other instruments:
|αj〉 = b1 · |β1〉 +ˆ b2 · |β2〉 +ˆ · · · = c1 · |γ1〉 +ˆ c2 · |γ2〉 +ˆ · · · = · · · ,
which is why it is logically meaningless to attribute one αk-click to that which carries statistics
of other clicks βk, γk, . . . and has nothing in common with α. All the more so the click may not
be related with physically descriptive collocations like ‘the measuring act on Bob’s electron
reveals the spin-up’. As in the ‘cat case’ (sect. 6.3.1), the spin-up here is a click-up rather
than a state |↑〉. To illustrate, a click of a photon with Alice/Bob has nothing in common
with distance between them or with speed of light. The click should not be an element of
the language in which |Ψ〉-terminology, numbers and physical properties have been employed
whatsoever; see also the second epigraph to sect. 2. It is a “folklore that “a measurement
leaves the system in the relevant eigenstate” . . . It is puzzling that some textbook authors
consider it good pedagogy to elevate this folklore to an “axiom” of quantum theory” [43,
p. 8].
Then something subsequently referred to as a state (the abstract) and a measurement (the
concrete) is created. However, as already stressed in sect. 2.4, process of abstracting—the set-
theoretic homomorphisms {Ψ,∪}֌ · · ·֌ {|Ψ〉, +ˆ, ·}—is a rather multistage one (sects. 3–
9), and reduction of this long sequence ‘for physical reasons’ always contains phenomenological
axioms a priori. Clearly, in the reverse direction we confront hard-to-disentangle assumptions
and the well-known axiomatic cycle.
In order to avoid paradoxes like ‘quantum cat’ (“state vector does not describe . . . a single
cat” [11, p. 37]), ‘the presence of a particle here and there’, or like ‘quantum bomb-testing’
(Elitzur–Vaidman) [7, 61],
• a severe notional differentiation between term ‘the state’ and adjectives/verbs with
physical images is required∗∗.
It seems preferable to radicalize the non-connectivity of these categories, i. e., to proclaim
it a postulate. For instance, a boldface italics in Remark 12 or selected thesis at the end of
sect. 6.5. At least, the differentiation between them should not be neglected in reasoning,
inasmuch as it seems unrealistic to change the deeply ingrained [148, p. 7] and ill-defined turns
of terminology such as “photon is in a certain state of polarization” [38, p. 5], ‘an observable
has/acquires a (numeric) value when being measured’, “outcome of a measurement” [7, 69,
84], ‘simultaneous measurability’ (see sect. 2.1 and pr. I), or ‘system is in superposition’
[92, 93], etc. With this mixing, circular logic (see Remark 10) will be present at all times.
See also pages 29–30 in the work [51] and notably an emphasized warning by D. Foulis about
∗An illustrative example in this regard is one of the first sentences from Everett’s PhD: “The state function ψ
is thought of as objectively characterizing the physical system . . . at all times . . . independently of our state
of knowledge of it” [45, p. 3], [17, p. 73]; and also, on p. 8, “The general validity of pure wave mechanics,
without any statistical assertions, is assumed for all physical systems, including observers and measuring
apparata”. And, again Everett’s: “The physical ‘reality’ is assumed to be the wave function of the whole
universe itself” [54, p. 100], [17, p. 70].
∗∗T. Maudlin: “. . . we need to keep the distinction between mathematical and physical entities sharp. Unfor-
tunately, the usual terminology makes this difficult” [100, p. 129]. Even indirect usage of the terminology
that came from the classical description can be a source of confusing. For example, so-called exchange
interaction as a ‘cause of correlation’ between identical parts of system.
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“a mistake, and a serious one!”, including criticism addressed to von Neumann on p. 29. In
other words,
• the interpretation of the quantum state is its definiendum. Even with the physical
terminology created, there may be only one paraphrase for the meaning to a state:
the abstract element of an abstract linear (not Hilbert) vector space over C˜∗.
It is ‘not Hilbert’ here due to the fact that the norm and inner-product are the extra math
add-on’s over H, coming from the (consequent) notion of a measurement and from Born’s
rule [24].
The most illustrative example is the (in)famous problem of measurement, which is the
subject of a vast literature containing opposing opinions [74, 69, 84, 89, 106, 29], and which
is the source of questions around locality in QM. The point here, put very briefly, is that the
measuring ‘problem’ is one of principle, not of practice. As we have seen, this problem is a
nonexistent and pseudo one [40] because in measurements nothing either propagates (much
less at superluminal speeds), nor is anything collapsed [11, 94], nullified, localized, there are
no such things as quantum jumps, and no pieces of the wave function are cut out.
G. Ludwig: “. . . there is no collapse of wave packets in reality.
Do not believe in fairy tales!” [94, p. 104].
A. Peres: “A state vector . . . does not evolve continuously between
measurements, nor suddenly “collapse” into a new state vector
whenever a measurement is performed” [112, p. 644].
B.-G. Englert: “State reduction is the technical term” [43, p. 8].
Again (see p. 22 and sect. 6.4), direct or indirect attempts to physically characterize this
function are hopeless, since it is the very DataSource around which all corresponding objects
and the language phrases—readings, frequencies and other quantities—are only slated to
create. It is impossible to ‘reconcile’ the (nonclassical) notion of a quantum state with (any)
its observational prototypes. However, the appeals regarding the irrelevance of the projective
postulate are often encountered in the literature [66, 134, 88, 80, 112, 59, 92, 93, 94].
Another example of circular logic is the critiqued [69, 139, 140] meaning of the phrase “an
ensemble of similarly prepared systems” [10, 69, 121]. The complete revision of this idea, as
was set forth above, does, in fact, demonstrate that, like in the ensemble approaches, “QM is a
usual statistical theory” [10], [94, p. 123], [105, p. 223], [13, 166, 4, 92, 94, 132, 107, 108] with
a frequency content of the randomness and with the classical logic [94] but with a different
mathematics of statistic’s calculus. It is different due to the fact that the theory is not tied,
as in classical description, to the notion of an observable quantity, and the ν’s are calculated
through the ‘other/abstract’ numbers [24]. However, for the same reason the emphasizing of
a close resemblance with the classical statistical mechanics [47, 97], [45, p. 72] is in error.
10.2. Interpretations and self-referentiality. Although we have not yet touch on other
significant attributes—the means over statistics, operators, and products of H-spaces will
be considered in their own rights, it is clear that the need to search for a description in
terms of hidden variables is also eliminated. Even from a formalistic perspective, the proof
of presence/absence [110, 39, 61] of these ‘physical’ quantities should be attributed to the
semantic conclusions of meta-theory ( = physics) [118], i. e., to theorems about formal theory
rather than to theorems of its calculus. In our case, and more generally, the formal theory
is the syntactical axioms of QM. The corollaries of such axioms are inherently unable to lead
to statements about interpretations [118], since theorems about object-theory itself is not
provable by means of its object-language [131, 118].
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A similar line of reasoning has accompanied quantum theory for quite a while: “claim
that the formalism by itself can generate an interpretation is unfounded and misleading”
(L. Ballentine [11]). It is known that even the mathematics itself cannot be defined in a
self-contained way [53, 79]. All of this stands in stark contrast with the known statement
of DeWitt to the effect that “mathematical formalism of the quantum theory is capable
of yielding its own interpretation” [37, p. 160, 165, 168] or that “conventional statistical
interpretation of quantum mechanics thus emerges from the formalism itself” [37, p. 185].
Especially, if we take into account the fact that it is not the theory itself, but only its
(formal) interpretation that determines the very semantic terms truth/falsity of sentences
(Go¨del). In turn, there may be more than one such interpretation. See also [71, p. 310], [20],
and specifically Ch. III in [79]. In other words, subconscious striving for ‘to interpret’—and
transporting the macro into the micro, is the very thing that prevents us from truly gaining
an understanding of quantum mathematics.
In any case, the fact that we were initially constructing the set-theoretic model (cf. [20]))
rather than an interpretation simply eliminates the problem, or, at most, transfers it into
the domain of questions of micro-transitions
A
99K and of T-family as employed entities (see
Remark 2). This is the domain of questions, which invoke the set theory at all. Be this as it
may, logic—formalized or not—does not allow us to make statements about statements, much
less a statement that refers to itself. The self-referentiality (“von Neumann catastrophe”) is
almost the main trouble [106, 108] encountered in quantum foundations. All of this, of course,
does not depend on whether the interpretation is built over in a strictly formalized [131] or
in a physically natural form. In effect, the issue of interpretations—in the rigorous definition
sense [118, Ch. 2], [131], [141]—is simply nonexistent. Accordingly, the demystification of
the known and the search for ontological interpretations to a-coordinates of the |Ψ〉-vector
[7, 49, 66]—the wave function—is no longer a problem, and with it disappears the Feynman
question of “the only consistent interpretation of this quantity” [48, p. 22]. See also M. Leifer’s
review [87] and extensive list of references therein.
11. Closing remarks
. . . quantum mechanics has been a rich
source for the invention of fairy tales
G. Ludwig & G. Thurler [94, p. 122]
I simply do not know how to change
quantum mechanics by a small amount
without wrecking it altogether
S. Weinberg
11.1. ‘Math-assembler’ and philosophy. Remembering and continuing sect. 1.3, it is gen-
erally tempting to infer that when creating the theory, we may not rest on any meanings that
are tacitly associated with the typical terminology; no matter, physical or mathematical.
To illustrate, even the very natural wordings—‘here/there’ (locality), ‘bigger/smaller’ (quan-
titative statements), ‘let a two-particle S’, ‘electron with Alice/Bob’, ‘consisting of . . . ’,
‘subsystem S1 in such-and-such system S’—are actually assumptions. They have already
comprised an equivalent of a measurement/preparation (sect. 3.1), of physical images, and of
some mathematics, including mixtures (23), or an attempt to ‘quickly’ bring the reasoning to
a Hilbert-space language. As in sect. 6.5, this may well be non-correct [100]. A source of an-
tinomies is in implicit implying, i. e., in the illogical—this we stress once again—confounding
of observations, clicks, numbers, physics, maths, and imagination, followed by the uncon-
trollable terminology ‘branching’. From this, there result the sense confusions, well-known
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no-go (meta)theorems∗ [18, 60], the locality ‘problem in QM’, and paradoxes like epr or the
jocular Bell question “Was the world wave function waiting to jump for thousands of mil-
lions of years . . . for some more highly qualified measurer — with a Ph.D.?” [18, p. 117],
[84, p. 18], [88, 80]. Clearly, quantum effects of observations do not depend on whether the
personified (homosapiens) or biological observer (Heisenberg–Zeilinger dog [78, pp. 171–174],
[43, 21])) perceives them; observer is just a formally logical element in theory. Without num-
bers, solely a quantitative theory is not possible (sect. 6.5), because the entire terminology
becomes indefinite.
Thus, once a mathematics and unambiguous language—spectra, means, and macroscopic
dynamical models—have been created, not only is there no longer a need to call on the
‘otherworldly’ or anthropic explanation ways, but the very presence of a certain share of
(circum-)philosophy—“a philosophical U¨berbau” [43, p. 12]—and subjectivity in quantum
foundations becomes extremely questionable. There is no longer any freedom to invent ex-
egeses (of ‘the quantum postulate Bible‘). Moreover, the freedom to ask questions is no longer
there, since the created object-language of states, of spectra, and of frequencies narrows down
the entire admissible lexicon. It may generate questions that are not only ill-posed but should
also be qualified as “meaningless” [109, p. 422], as in sect. 6.5. For example, those that are
based on an intuitive perception of the term observation by human being or questions about
‘the underlying nature of reality’, the notion of a ‘physical level of rigor’ with regard to
the grounds of quantum theory and, in general, the thinking about ‘how the world should
function’ at the micro-level [94, p. 100].
In the classical paradigm, the language sentences are always interrelated, since, one way
or another, all of them refer to the observational concepts. The language intuition usually
makes it easy for us to do away with paradoxes the semantic closedness causes. However,
the quantum theory is just a situation in which contradictions are inevitable. This fact—
thinking (even if partly/implicitly) by the classical objects (D. Deutsch’s “bad philosophy”)
with ‘quantum conclusions’—is the very source of paradoxes, since the human intuition is
rather problematic and personal category. (A. Stairs: “Don’t trust intuition” [138, p. 256])
Because of this, in order to avoid collisions between theory and meta-language, the subcon-
scious striving of the natural language to include one in the other has to be limited; see
Remark 10. Einstein adds also the situations when “er fu¨hrt dazu, u¨berhaupt alle sprachlich
ausdru¨ckbaren Sa¨tze als sinnleer zu erkla¨ren” [41, p. 33]. A. Leggett’s comments on “pseu-
doquestions” and “gibberish” at the end of sect. 1.2 may then be strengthened so that the
meaninglessness should become an element of language, including the language of ‘philosophy
of quanta’.
• The rudimentary quantum (meta)mathematics creates the notion of a prohibited
statement/question∗∗, one that is devoid of meaning. These sentences, which in-
volve classical analogies in circumvention of 1) the |α〉-representatives to the non-
interpretable abstraction |Ψ〉 and 2) of the numerical quantities’ nature (sect. 9.1).
See also pages 234–235 in [122] with Bohr’s appeals regarding the “necessity of a radical
revision of basic principles for physical explanation . . . revision of the foundation for the
∗“. . . combined with some peculiar terminology, has led to confusion . . . A woefully common feature, . . .
each protagonist had some interpretation of the quantum state in mind, but never stated clearly what it
was” (L. Ballentine [15, pp. 2, 6]).
∗∗Cf. the ’t Hooft remark: “I go along with everything [Copenhagen] says, except for one thing, and the one
thing is you’re not allowed to ask any questions”.
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unambiguous use of elementary concepts” and his comment on words “phenomena”, “obser-
vations”, “attributes”, and “measurements” on p. 237.
The literature on this subject, even taking only the qualified sources into account, is vast
[1, 16, 5, 36, 44, 49, 56, 60, 70, 100, 104, 103, 111, 121, 125, 127, 61, 163, 166, 84, 69, 140, 7] and
abounds with terminology—“. . . words, ostensibly English” (A. Leggett [84, p. 300; emphasis
ours]), that completely defies translation into the language of events or of concretization: ob-
server’s consciousness, parallel/branching universes/worlds, free will, catalogue of knowledge,
world branch, mental information, and also the collocations like rational agent, information
has been recorded/transmitted/(not)reached an observer (Wigner’s friend), teleporting a
state, many-minds/worlds/words, quantum psychology, psycho-physical parallelism (in this
connection, see [31, p. 86(!)]), and more.
Of course, “without philosophy, science would lose its critical spirit and would eventu-
ally become a technical device” [7, p. 800] but, on the other hand, “the concept of the free
will cannot be defined by indications on devices” [93, p. 151] and “one must not confuse
physics with philosophy” [43, p.12]. As concerns the attitudes towards QM—at the sugges-
tion of M. Tegmark in the 1990’s, there even carried out polls and statistical analysis of their
correlations [129]. There are also known attempts to involve here the biology of conscious-
ness/brain [140, 147], [124, sect. 6], [125, Ch. 9]. Regarding them, however, there have been
not merely sceptical but quite opposite opinions [155, sects. 5–6], [93, §XII.5(!)]. Of special
note is Ballentine’s remark “to stop talking about “consciousness” or “free will” on the last
page of the preprint [15].
As a result, we gain “a contribution to philosophy, but not to physics” [98, p. 86]. At the
same time, the proposed math ‘∪-assembler’
Ψ
A
999K α,

Ξ

-brace (31), (∨,∈,∪)-‘logic’ (36)–(39)
is quite sufficient for creating the object-language. Giving a natural form to it would be
acceptable, however, it is clear that the set-theoretic ∪-base of the language cannot be avoided
[20]. Nevertheless, the syntactically more formal description of transitions/brace/numbers
is surely of interest and value. This would turn, however, all the above material into a
mathematical logic text, what is we eschew in the present work. It is probably for this reason
that the very important and extremely thorough works∗ by Gu¨nther Ludwig [90, 91, 92, 93]
and by his school are often left out of the literature on quantum foundations. Among other
things, in spite of explicit pointing out a “solution in principle of the measuring problem”
in [92, p. V] (and subtitle “Derivation of Hilbert Space Structure” of [92]), name of this
author has not been mentioned in the detailed reviews [87, 123, 160] and even in the books
[132, 56, 125, 106, 121, 111].
11.2. Well, where’s probability? An answer to this question in quantum theory is brief
enough—nowhere, because “There is no probability meter” (S. Saunders [121, p. 185]) and re-
lationship of this concept with empiricism is unique [13, p. 46]—the frequencies {νj}. Cf. the
famous De Finetti (1970) remark “probability does not exist” and A. Khrennikov’s comment
“It seems that the machinery of randomness has no applications in quantum physics. Ex-
perimenters are only interested in . . . frequencies” [76, p. 36]. Or, expressed differently by
von Mises’ words,
∗Pre-theories, 76 axioms [92, p. 241], ordered sets, morphisms, absence of the word superposition in [92, 90],
(valid) criticism of “theories of states” [94], etc.
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“If we base the concept of probability, not on the notion of relative frequency, . . .
at the end of the calculations, the meaning of the word ’probability’ is silently
changed from that adopted at the start to a definition based on the concept of
frequency” [105, p. 134] (emphasis ours).
Otherwise, quantum foundations would require an interpretation of Kolmogorov’s axioms,
and the latter, in turn, require interpreting the concept of the number—an axiomatic add-on
over the ZF theory [82]. Bearing in mind the primary nature of numbers and nontriviality
of their emergence in a physical theory (sect. 7.2), it is not just impossible to avoid the
phenomenological frequencies [113, p. 25]. Logic forbids them from being subsidiary with
reference to probability in any definition, i. e., as Pauli had been convinced, “the concept of
‘probability’ should not occur in the fundamental laws of a satisfying physical theory” (letter
from Pauli to Bohr in 1925).
The ensemble empiricism, for its part, is self-sufficient∗, and the only conventionality within
it is an infinite number of repetitions. Its formalization is an appropriate axiom in the ZF-
theory [82, 68]. Expressed another way, any non-frequency framework for what we have been
calling QM-probability ‘attracts vague justifications’ in terms of its surrogates: potentiality,
tendency, propensity (K. Popper), amount of ignorance, subjective uncertainty [121] or like-
lihood, degree of belief, etc [49]. But even from philosophical point of view “probability is a
deeply troublesome notion” (L. Hardy [127, p. 78]), that is supported by the vast literature
on this subject [145](!), [143, pp. 41–43], [133, Ch. 3–4], [7, 3, 36, 77, 78]; “philosophy of
probability is a scandal” [121, p. 550]. Pauli recollected the frequent Einstein’s remarks in
this regard: “One can’t make a theory out of a lot of ‘maybe’s’ [ = probably] . . . deep down
it is wrong, even if it is empirically and logically right”. Thus, probability in quantum theory
may only be a shortened term for the relative frequencies.
The ultimate conclusion completes Remark 7. If we accept the set-theoretic viewpoint of
things then sect. 5.1, by all appearances, provides a positive answer to the question of the
rigidity of QM-theory [33]—“change any one aspect, and the whole structure collapses” [1,
p. 1]. See also the 2-nd epigraph to this section. At least, it is hard to imagine what any
other (axiom-free) way of turning empiricism into quantum mathematics would look like, as
soon as we abandon the minimalistic entity Ψ
A
99K α.
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